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 Since the early 20th century, persons across the Muslim 
world have attempted to move their society toward a more 
religious Islamic path. They have attempted to form 
political parties and participate in elections, only to be 
marginalized and repressed. Some have reacted violently, 
carrying out attacks against government officials and other 
targets. Typically a cycle of violence, repression and 
political exclusion transpires.  
 Democratic reform is not uncomplicated. Both practical 
considerations and moral ones demand changes in the 
policies of both the United States and Egypt. The Egyptian 
government’s electoral engineering and interference does 
not go unnoticed by the world and undermines the legitimacy 
of the government to its own citizens and the world 
community alike.  
 Co-opting moderate Islamists may seem threatening to 
President Mubarak as well as to Western countries, whose 
public continues to embrace Orientalist ideas. This study 
maintains that when moderate Islamists are allowed to 
participate in politics, they will restrain their stances 
regarding strict interpretations of Islam, as have the New 
Islamists in Egypt. The alternative is the status quo, 
which aside from being immoral in terms of personal liberty 
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 The importance of this work is to establish the 
relationship between episodes of political violence, 
carried out by Islamists on the one hand, and conditions of 
political inclusion afforded to them by the government of 
Egypt on the other. A large majority of Egyptians are 
Muslims and many are sympathetic to groups like the Muslim 
Brotherhood (hereafter referred to as the Brotherhood), who 
meet many of their needs that cannot or will not be met by 
the government. Furthermore, Egyptian governments are aware 
of this popularity and have felt threatened by any group 
that might mobilize large portions of Egypt’s population, 
especially those that may challenge the government’s power. 
As such, the government has been quick to curtail Islamist 
consolidation of power through myriad means. Of interest to 
this study is the government’s blocking of Islamist 
participation in politics and the repercussions of this 
policy.  Christianity in the West has undergone a 
reformation and as a rule separates government from 
religion. The Muslim has not had such a reformation however 
and in many Muslim countries, there is no such separation. 
 In the United States, the common perception is that 
Islamic terrorists take actions based solely upon religious 
or irrational fanatical motivation. There are two main 
reasons for this perception. The first is failure of the 
American public to educate themselves regarding the Middle 
East region, its culture and its circumstances. The second 
is due to the Middle Eastern (or Egypt in this study) 
governments’ campaigns of misinformation attempting to 
discredit Islamists that are willing to “work within the 
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system,” given the opportunity. The Egyptian government has 
often grouped all Islamists together, especially after 
episodes of anti-government violence carried out by 
militant Islamists. This can be characterized as naive, 
since acts of political violence, often dubbed, 
“terrorism,” can be interpreted as rationally calculated 
choices by a group of actors. In The New Global Terrorism: 
Characteristics, Causes, Controls, Richard Rubenstein 
provides six possible motives that frequently generate 
terrorist violence. They are: 
 To publicize the activist’s cause, provide 
evidence of its supporters’ intensity, and force 
(enemies and allies) to take it seriously 
 To awaken the masses, who have been bribed or 
coerced into silence, by performing acts of 
‘heroic,’ sacrificial violence that will inspire 
imitation 
 To expose the state...as a brutal and oppressive 
force requiring violent opposition or overthrow 
 To mobilize and activate neutrals or passive 
sympathizers by catching them in the ‘crossfire’ 
between the state and the terrorist fighters 
 To eliminate or incapacitate leaders or 
organizations that might otherwise be effective 
opponents of the terrorists’ cause 
 To make territory ungovernable, or governable 
only at an unacceptable cost, thereby forcing the 
withdrawal of foreign occupiers or a change of 
regime.1 
 
Anti-American militants in Iraq in 2004, described by many 
as “terrorists,” clearly have many of these motivations. 
The last two were particularly evident in the summer of 
2004. 
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1 Richard E. Rubenstein, “The Psycho-Political Sources of Terrorism.” In The New Global Terrorism: 
Characteristics, Causes, Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley Jr. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
2003), 140. 
 Numerous renowned scholars describe what they call 
“expressive” motivations for terrorists like Osama bin 
Laden. Rubenstein quotes Harvard professor Jessica Stern 
who claims that bin Laden’s motives are expressive because: 
 Catastrophic attacks will not achieve the 
attackers’ objectives 
 Groups that are expressing anger can 
continuously change their mission statement 
 Expressive terrorism “enables cynical leaders 
to attract youth who feel humiliated, 
culturally or personally.”2 
 
Rubenstein disagrees with this perspective of “expressive 
terrorism.” He argues that Al Qaeda’s attack delivered a 
costly blow to the U.S. economy, publicized the cause, 
polarized public opinion in the Islamic world, and evoked a 
violent reaction by the United States.3 Since these are all 
goals of Al Qaeda, Rubenstein therefore argues against the 
idea of terrorism as merely expressive of emotions. Of 
note, most U.S. military forces have fully departed Prince 
Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia for other countries in the 
region, an expressed goal of bin Laden. While there is 
still a U.S. military training mission in Saudi Arabia, the 
majority of forces departed the country in 2003. 
 A different perspective examines the motivations of 
persons that are members of underground political 
organizations. Egypt has historically constrained full 
democratic participation and has repeatedly repressed or 
denied access to the government for certain groups 
(typically those that are most threatening to it). Some of 
these groups are illegal and as such have had to move 
underground to survive.  
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
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3 Ibid., 143. 
 Della Porta examines existing theories on why persons 
are motivated to act as part of an underground political 
organization. According to her, “research shows no typical 
patterns in the primary socialization of militants, no 
particular family problems or authoritarian upbringing.”4  
 In underground organizations, individual motives are 
clearly tied to group motivations. In these organizations 
there is a great need for secrecy. Once a person joins, 
they develop intense ties to the group and may eventually 
believe that they either cannot or would not want to live 
life outside of the organization.5 This mindset can 
completely change in a person’s life, and is similar to the 
mindset found in youth gangs in urban areas of the United 
States where ties to the group are stronger than a casual 
observer may recognize. 
 Regarding violence, research and interviews show that 
“protest repertoires gradually escalated toward violence.”6 
Also, once violence starts, states often take harsh 
repressive action. In international relations theory, one’s 
defensive actions or weapons purchases/procurements can be 
viewed as offensive by the other side causing escalation of 
one’s own activity. And so it goes, each side undermining 
each other’s security. This is what is called the rational 
spiral model or security dilemma of conflict escalation.7 
Underground organizations’ relations with repressive 
governments seem similar to the spiral model in 
                                                 
4 Donatella Della Porta, “Introduction: On Individual Motivations in Underground Political Organizations.” 
Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations, ed. Donatella Della Porta, 
(Greenwich, CN: JAI Press Inc., 1992) 7. 
5 Ibid., 9. 
6 Ibid., 12. 
 4
7 Charles L. Glaser, “When Are Arms Races Dangerous: Rational versus Suboptimal Arming” International 
Security, Vol. 28, [website on-line];  http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?tid=14422&ttype=6 
Accessed 2 Aug 2004. 
international relations, albeit in an asymmetrical fashion. 
In this case, the underground organization views the state 
as de-legitimized once repression begins. Similarly, states 
often refuse to negotiate with “terrorists” that do not 
work within “legal,” peaceful means. Members of underground 
organizations often believe that the state has committed 
the most serious violations of the “rules of the game.”8 
 This present study specifically concerns acts of 
political violence carried out by Egyptian Islamists. These 
acts are quite variable in their severity and occurrence, 
suggesting that there may be something more than religious 
beliefs or fanaticism influencing them. Hopefully a better 
understanding of the conditions under which Islamist acts 
of political violence occur can lead to policy steps to 
alleviate this violence. The present study is an attempt to 
aid in such understanding.  
 Additionally, the important implications for United 
States’ foreign policy can not be understated. Catch-all 
rhetoric regarding cultures and/or Islamists is probably 
not in the best interest of the United States, since this 
can actually help to legitimize the actions of militant 
Islamists who partake in political violence, directed 
either against their own government or Western states and 
their interests. During the Cold War, authoritarian 
nationalist governments were not only tolerated but were 
supported by Western governments (including the United 
States), as long as they did not turn toward communism or 
socialism under the wing of the Soviet Union. In the case 
of oil-producing Arab countries, the free flow of 
reasonably-priced oil to the West was a key reason to 
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8 Della Porta, 15. 
support regimes. The West cared little about how the 
countries were run, as long as those two conditions were 
met.  
 Undoubtedly, the United States supported many such 
governments as an alternative to a communist Soviet 
Satellite state. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, came the 
realization that many authoritarian regimes remained.  Some 
of these had been supported by the West even though they 
did not embrace Western values, or even any type of limited 
democracy. This is a problem the United States was partly 




A. POLITICAL INCLUSION AND ISLAMISM 
 What effect does political inclusion have on the 
amount of violence perpetrated by Islamists in Egypt? Does 
it moderate Islamist actions? For this study, I have chosen 
to examine the case of Egypt. The hypothesis used is that 
political inclusion of moderate Islamists has a direct 
negative correlation with the amount of political violence. 
The thesis builds upon the work of others, especially 
Mohammed M. Hafez’s work, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and 
Resistance in the Islamic World. This book contains up to 
date case studies on predominantly Muslim countries where 
governments have repressed Islamists especially Algeria and 
Egypt.  
 While many feel that democracy cannot exist in Islamic 
society (including some militant Islamists), some 
 6
moderates, including the current Brotherhood in Egypt, have 
attempted to remain in the “system,” running for parliament 
when elections are held. Historically, the government just 
prior to elections jails many members of the Brotherhood. 
This action has in the past empowered the more radical 
offshoots of the organization to commit acts of violence 
against the repressive government.  
 For the purposes of this study, the term “amount” 
refers to both the frequency and the intensity of the acts 
of political violence. I propose a scale to measure 
political inclusion with full political inclusion on one 
end of the spectrum and violent repression on the other end 
of the spectrum. Similarly, amounts of political violence 
can be measured on a scale. At one end of the scale would 
be periods of peace where there are no violent acts and at 
the other end would be frequent murders, massacres and 
assassinations.  
 A key argument of this study is that the popular 
legitimacy of political violence increases as political 
inclusion declines. The concept of popular legitimacy for 
this study means that a large portion of the public 
supports an action, therefore making it “legitimate.” This 
support for anti-state violence may be particularly 
apparent when the government is viewed as elitist and 
corrupt. I would argue that giving the Islamists freedom to 
associate politically and participate in truly free 
elections would delegitimize the militant Islamists while 
legitimizing moderate members of the movement. Thus, the 
level of legitimacy of political violence is an important 
intervening variable. 
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 If my hypothesis is correct, Arab countries 
(Egypt in this case) should grant Islamists access to the 
political system in an effort to delegitimize political 
violence. 
 
B. CURRENT THEORIES REGARDING ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY 
 There are numerous theories regarding Islam and 
democracy. They are theories because in the countries of 
the Muslim world, there is no true democracy. The non-
profit group Freedom House conducts an annual survey of 
countries around the world to determine levels of freedom. 
They examine political rights and civil liberties using a 
moderately-sized bank of questions regarding the conditions 
in each country. Once their data is gathered, Freedom House 
gives each nation a score from 1 to 7. A score of from 1.0 
through 2.5 signifies the highest levels of Freedom House’s 
version of freedom, what they call “free.” A score falling 
in the range of 3.0 to 5.0 is “partly free,” while 
countries with a higher score are deemed “not free.” A 
country with a score of “1.0” is defined as follows (for 
political rights and civil liberties, respectively): 
Countries and territories that receive a rating 
of 1 for political rights come closest to the 
ideals suggested by the checklist questions, 
beginning with free and fair elections. Those who 
are elected rule, there are competitive parties 
or other political groupings, and the opposition 
plays an important role and has actual power. 
Minority groups have reasonable self-government 




Countries and territories that receive a rating 
of 1 come closest to the ideals expressed in the 
civil liberties checklist, including freedom of 
expression, assembly, association, education and 
religion. They are distinguished by an 
established and generally equitable system of 
rule of law. Countries and territories with this 
rating enjoy free economic activity and tend to 
strive for equality of opportunity. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum are the countries with a 
score of “7.0.” These countries’ conditions are explained 
as follows (for political rights and civil liberties 
respectively): 
 
For countries and territories with a rating of 7, 
political rights are absent or virtually nonexistent 
as a result of the extremely oppressive nature of the 
regime or severe oppression in combination with civil 
war. States and territories in this group may also be 
marked by extreme violence or warlord rule that 
dominates political power in the absence of an 
authoritative, functioning central government. 
 
States and territories with a rating of 7 have 
virtually no freedom. An overwhelming and 
justified fear of repression characterizes these 
societies.9 
 
Of interest to this study are the countries of the world 
with a primarily Muslim populace. The table below is an 
extract of data found in Freedom House’s Freedom in the 
World 2004 Survey,10 showing data for those countries that 
are predominantly Muslim. While the table does not show all 
countries it does show a representative grouping of 
countries: 
                                                 
9 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Methodology”, 
[http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm] accessed 2 Aug 2004. 
 9
10 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2004”, 
[http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/combined2004.pdf] accessed 2 Aug 2004. 




















Figure 1. Freedom House Survey Scores 
Also of interest for this study is the absence of any 
predominantly Muslim country being given a rating of 
“free.” About one-third were “partly free,” and the rest 
were “not free.” Of particular concern is that five of the 
eight countries worldwide with a rating of 7.0 were Muslim 
countries. Egypt, the subject of this study, was given a 
rating of 6.0, “not free.”  
 While Egypt does hold elections, they always exhibit 
some form of tampering whether it is preventing voters from 
reaching polling places or outlawing any “religious” 
political parties from participating in elections. These 
episode of interference will be discussed further in the 
study as they relate to particular periods and governments. 
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 Finally, we could not examine Islam and democracy 
without looking at some of the challenges regarding the 
authoritarian governments in the Middle East. Egypt is one 
of these. Eva Bellin argues compellingly about the 
difficulties that must be overcome in this regard. She 
argues that the robustness of the coercive apparatus must 
be considered when examining Middle Eastern authoritarian 
regimes and prospects for democracy.11 She asserts that 
there are at least four variables that are crucial to the 
possibility of authoritarian regimes allowing their 
societies to experiment with democracy.  
 The first is that, “the robustness of the coercive 
apparatus is directly linked to maintenance of fiscal 
health.”12 What this means is that if the coercive 
apparatus, whether police, military or other force, is well 
funded for supplies and salaries, it is more likely to 
support the regime in power. 
 The second variable of importance is that, “the 
robustness of the coercive apparatus is also shaped by 
successful maintenance of international support networks.”13 
When the international community supports an authoritarian 
regime, that regime is more likely to be able to hold onto 
power. The end of the Cold War is a good example of this 
theory. When both the United States and the former Soviet 
Union stopped funding for authoritarian states, they often 
soon failed and gave way to more democratic states. 
 Third is that “the robustness of the coercive 
apparatus, or of its will to repress reform initiatives, is 
                                                 
11 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective.” Comparative Politics (January 2004). 144. 
12 Ibid., 144. 
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13 Ibid., 144. 
inversely related to its level of institutionalization.”14 
In other words, when the coercive apparatus view themselves 
as servants of the public and professionals versus cronies 
of the regime leaders, In this case, they are less likely 
to feel they owe something to the regime. A professional 
military and/or police force is less likely to give the 
government carte blanche to do as they please when it 
involves repressing the public. 
 Lastly, she states that, “the coercive apparatus’ 
capacity and will to hold on to power is shaped by the 
degree to which if faces a high level of popular 
mobilization.”15 When governments keep up a high level of 
repressive activity against their own citizens for a 
prolonged period of time, the fiscal and social costs 
mount. Even some of the most repressive regimes realize 
that these costs can eventually jeopardize their ability to 
hold power in the future. In places where the population 
overwhelmingly is able to voice its opposition to the 
government, that government’s power is challenged. 
According to O’Donnell and Schmitter,  
They (authoritarian governments) are regimes that 
practice dictatorship and repression in the 
present while promising democracy and freedom in 
the future. Thus, they can justify themselves in 
political terms only as transitional powers, 
while attempting to shift attention to their 
immediate substantive accomplishments—typically, 
the achievement of ‘social peace’ or economic 
development.16 
 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 145 
15 Ibid., 146. 
 12
16 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 15. 
 In the case of Egypt, the state has been able to hold 
its authoritarian power since gaining its independence from 
Britain by alternately repressing Islamist forces and 
appeasing the masses with such issues as Arab nationalism, 
anti-Zionism or free university education. The latter came 
with the promise of cushy government employment following 
graduation. After awhile, none of these appeasements 
appeared to satisfy an Egyptian public unable to otbain the 
most basic government services. At times when the 
government has not been able to provide these services, the 
masses have increasingly turned toward Islamic charity for 
a helping hand. This gives the Islamists mass appeal and 
possibilities for popular mobilization in the future. 
 
C. ISLAMIST REASONS WHY DEMOCRACY CAN OR CANNOT WORK IN 
 MUSLIM COUNTRIES 
 Two prominent Islamist groups in Egypt, the Gemaa and 
al-Jihad “rejected democracy as a secular innovation that 
is thoroughly un-Islamic and, more importantly, cannot be 
Islamized.”17 Reasons these groups give for this view are 
that, “democracy gives the right to legislate to someone 
other than God, which is equivalent to deifying the 
people…The only way to reaffirm God’s sovereignty is by 
making his laws (sharia) the sole source of legislation.”18 
Sheikh Abd al-Rahman (currently imprisoned in the United 
States for his role in the 1993 terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Center) demonstrates Gemaa’s disdain for 
secular law and Western thought in his writings by stating 
that, “it (secular law), derived from Western thought, 
                                                 
17 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World. (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 181. 
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18 Ibid. 
which is alien to the religion of Islam, must be 
eliminated…the ruler who has replaced God’s law with 
constitutional law ‘must be fought until he returns to 
God’s law…or he must be uprooted.’”19 In Jordan, the concept 
of the primacy of sharia is explained by Ahmad Qutash al-
Azayida, an Islamist Deputy of the Lower House in Jordan. 
He states, “Islamic law is what all Muslims want and the 
rule of the majority is democracy.”20 
 Other Islamist groups have a starkly different 
perspective regarding democracy. For example, the 
Brotherhood, “believes that democracy and pluralism are not 
only permissible but also desirable because they are an 
essential part of the Islamic notion of consultation 
(shura).”21 Quoting one Muslim Brother, `Isam al-`Aryan 
supports democratic reform this way, “the Brothers consider 
constitutional rule to be closest to Islamic rule…We are 
the first to call for and apply democracy. We are devoted 
to it until death.”22 The Brotherhood enjoys a larger 
following in Egypt compared to either the Gemaa or al-
Jihad. This may be a sign that the Muslims in Egypt at 
large, hold a more moderate view of democracy and do not 
support the views of the Gemaa or al-Jihad.  
 
D. ARAB COUNTRIES’ REASONS FOR NOT POLITICALLY INVOLVING 
 ISLAMISTS 
 Most governments in the Arab world are authoritarian 
regimes. While some profess to be democratic and actually 
have elections, the reality is that the leader of the 
                                                 
19 Denis J. Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 85. 
20 Daniel Pipes, “Are Today’s Islamic Movements Compatible with Democracy?”, Middle East Forum 
[available from http://www.meforum.org/article/pipes/347] accessed 2 Aug 2004 
21 Hafez, 181. 
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22 Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, 48. 
country usually has such power that the important part of 
the elections always goes in favor of the leader. 
Opposition groups may win some seats in a legislative body 
however these are usually only in a consultative role to 
the state’s leader. Islamists that argue against democracy 
argue that electing officials to such a powerless body 
legitimizes the government while undermining their own 
goals. While there may be some truth in this, it could be 
argued that some representation is better than none at all.  
 In Egypt, President Mubarak claims to be moving his 
country down the path toward democracy. In order to 
maintain legitimacy, Mubarak may have to allow more 
participation by Islamists in politics. According to Carrie 
Rosefsky Wickham, “an authoritarian regime’s pursuit of 
democratic legitimacy may force it to accommodate 
opposition actors that it could suppress by force.”23 
 Talk of democracy in Egypt notwithstanding, the 
Mubarak government has faced direct challenges from violent 
Islamists in the form of assassination attempts, attacks on 
tourists and other targets in at attempt to delegitimize 
the regime. When these situations have occurred in the 
past, the Egyptian government has cut a broad swath of 
repression of all Islamists stating that the more violent 
ones are simply branches of groups like the Brotherhood. 
The government’s rationale for repressing all Islamists is 
what the Mubarak government calls, “drying the springs.”24 
Even though certain people such as the “New Islamists” have 
consistently “spoken out strongly and consistently against 
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extremist violence,”25 the government has had a policy that 
is, “aimed to eliminate all independent sources of 
religiousness in society with the rationalization that they 
feed extremism.”26 
 Finally, a further reason Arab countries may not want 
to allow participation by Islamists in a democratic forum 
is that authoritarian regimes generally have an overarching 
goal of regime survival at all costs. These regimes know 
that given the chance to mobilize the people, Islamists may 
challenge the power of the state leading to regime change. 
The moderates are seen by the government as the biggest 
challenge to their legitimacy rather than the jihadi 
militants. For this reason, Egyptian leaders have tolerated 
the non-militant Islamists only slightly more than the 
militant ones. Raymond Baker states that: 
In effect, the regime understood moderate Islam 
as its most serious opposition. Instead of 
turning to the Islamist moderates as allies 
against extremism, the regime sought aggressively 
to dry up all the Islamist sources for engagement 
in public life. Quite deliberately, this policy 
blurred the distinction between moderate and 
extremist Islamists.27 
 
Leaders of these regimes lead lives of power and luxuries 
which would obviously be gone once they are removed from 
power. Additionally, authoritarian rulers often have a 
short lifespan after being removed from power. 
 
E. WESTERN CONCERNS ABOUT ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 
 Some of the West’s concerns about Islam and democracy 
are a result of Western perceptions of the region. When 
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violent Islamists state that democracy is incompatible with 
Islam, some agree and use this as a reason to repress 
Islamists. These type of statements make better newspaper 
headlines than statement by moderates that are 
accommodative of democratic principles.  
 The United States’ policy in the Middle East has never 
had democracy as its paramount goal. The goal has always 
been stable governments willing to sell oil to the world 
market at a “reasonable” price. The other chief goal was 
that of geopolitical influence and power. This was of great 
importance during the Cold War, which had a polarizing 
effect on the countries of the world. The Middle East was 
no exception.  
 During and even before the Cold War, the United States 
supported governments that yielded to American influence 
and had policies friendly to the U.S. and its interests. 
Some of these governments offer the least freedom to their 
citizens yet they were supported by the United States. 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt described this 
situation this way (discussing the United States’ 
relationship with Nicaragua’s dictator, Anastasio Samosa) 
“they may be sons of bitches but at least they are our sons 
of bitches.”28 This mindset demonstrates that loyalty to the 
United States has been a more powerful reason for foreign 
policy decisions than has the spread of democracy.  
 The United States supported the government of the Shah 
of Iran until he was deposed during the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution in Iran. Since that time, the United States has 
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had a very suspicious policy toward persons endeavoring to 
establish an Islamic government. 
 Another concern regarding democracy in Muslim 
countries is the concept of “one person, one vote, one 
time.” This theory implies the following; “they worry that 
Islamist parties would come to power through elections and 
then impose their own brand of tyranny, cutting democracy 
short and implementing anti-American foreign policies to 
boot.”29 This theory has yet to be tested however. The 
situation in Algeria would have been interesting to follow 
had the Islamists that won the election there been allowed 
to take the leadership of the government. Many theorists 
predict that had the Islamists gained power, they would 
have had to moderate their positions in order to maintain 
legitimacy amongst the Algerian people. Instead, the 
election results were disallowed and the military forced 
their own views on the country, thus ending the chance of 
peaceful democratic reform in Algeria for years to come. 
 While some of these issues may be cause for concern, 
it is premature to believe that any Islamist election 
victory will mean the end of democracy for that country. 
More likely is the scenario that the Islamists will have to 
learn to share power with the other elected representatives 
as they have in Lebanon. 
 
F. WESTERN REASONS FOR ENCOURAGING DEMOCRACIES IN ARAB 
 STATES 
 There are numerous reasons the United States should 
encourage the spread of democracy across Arab states. 
First, according to modern democratic peace theory (and 
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statistics) is that democracies rarely fight wars with 
other democracies. While there have been some anomalies 
since the concept of democracy was put into practice, the 
theory is a pretty solid one.  
 Secondly, the Arab world is a prime source of fossil 
fuels to the world. Having democracies (that in theory 
would not fight each other) would stabilize the region and 
help with a steady supply of fuel exports thus helping to 
stimulate the world economy.  
 Thirdly and perhaps the most important reason 
democracy should be encouraged in the region is a moral 
one. While it may be difficult to keep corruption out of 
democracies in the region, democracies are a better moral 
alternative to the current authoritarian regimes in the 
region that play favorites, are rife with bureaucratic 
ineptness, repress their own people and simply are not the 
best stewards of the state’s resources. Democracy should be 
encouraged simply because we believe that individual 
liberty is a right that all humans share and is the best 
vehicle for ensuring such liberty. 
 Finally, involving Islamists in a democratic process 
may moderate violent behavior and empower those Islamists 
that want to have a democratic process. Pushing the jihadis 
toward the edge of societal opinion would not be a bad 
thing. 
 
G. OVERVIEW OF THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN EGYPT 
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 Egypt is the birthplace of modern Islamism in the 
Muslim world. Hassan al-Banna, formed the society of Muslim 
Brothers (the Muslim Brotherhood or Ikhwan) in 1928. Al-
Banna was educated and trained as a teacher and 
taught Arabic. At the age of twenty-two, he became fed up 
with the corruption of the government, the colonial rule of 
the British an the factionalism of Muslims whom al-Banna 
asserted were turning away from true Islam and were turning 
toward Western values.30 According to Walid Abdelnasser, the 
formation of the Brotherhood was as a reaction to a number 
of events such as: “the fall of the Islamic Khalifa 
(caliph) in 1924, the colonization of the Muslim world by 
Western powers, and the spread of westernization in Muslim 
countries.”31 Probably the most prevalent of these three was 
the matter of colonization. The Brotherhood recruited based 
upon forming an Islamic state, reintroduction of a caliph, 
implementation of sharia (Islamic law based upon the Quran) 
and above all, expulsion of the British colonialists from 
Egypt. Al-Banna also “believed that any territory where a 
Muslim lived was a part of the Muslim world and should be 
defended. He treated any country which transgressed against 
the Muslim homeland as a tyrannical state that should be 
resisted in all manners.”32 
 The basic premise of the Brotherhood is that “…all 
difficulties in Islamic society stemmed from a deviation 
from the ideals of early Islam.”33 Al-Banna described his 
goals for the Brotherhood as follows: 
 
You are not a benevolent society, nor a political 
party, nor a local organization having limited 
purposes. Rather, you are a new soul in the heart 
of the nation to give it life by means of the 
Quran…When asked what it is you propagate, reply 
                                                 
30 David Waines, An Introduction to Islam (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 240. 
31 Walid Abdelnasser: The Islamic Movement In Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations 1967-1981. 
(London: Kegan Paul International. 1994), 33. 
32 Ibid., 35. 
 20
33 Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, Inc. 1985), 21. 
that it is Islam, the message of Muhammad, the 
religion that contains within it government…If 
you are told that you are political, answer that 
slam admits no distinction.34 I
 
The Brotherhood quickly grew across Egypt and its 
membership totaled between one and two million people by 
1949.35 The popularity of the group and the leadership’s 
statement that sharia should replace Egypt’s secular law 
led King Farouk to ban the Brotherhood in 1948. These 
actions began a spiral of actions that would put the 
Brotherhood and Egypt’s government at odds until the 
present time. The Egyptian Prime Minister, Majmud Fahmi al-
Nuqrashi was assassinated by a Muslim Brother shortly after  
the group was banned. “in retribution, the regime arranged 
for al-Banna’s assassination by the secret police on 12 
February 1949.”36  
 Cycles of inclusion and repression of the Brotherhood 
have been the government’s hallmark since this time. 
Another significant leader of the Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb 
was imprisoned and hanged by the government in 1969. Qutb 
had more radical views than his predecessors and was not 
afraid to put them to paper. His book, Milestones, Qutb 
calls for jihad in order to further the cause of Islam. He 
discredits the secular government which Qutb describes in 
the following way: 
 
These (government appointed Muslim scholars) have 
adopted the Western concept of ‘religion’, which 
is merely a name for ‘belief’ in the heart, 
having no relation to the practical affairs of 
life, and therefore they conceive of religious 
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war as a war to impose belief on people’s hearts. 
But this is not the case with Islam…the way of 
life ordained by God for all mankind.37 
 
 All of the Egyptian governments that have followed 
King Farouk have alternated in their relationship with the 
Brotherhood. In the early 1990s, when the Brotherhood was 
again legal, they did very well in elections, even though 
the government made it difficult for them to do so. It 
would seem that over the long-haul that the Brotherhood has 
been and will continue to be the greatest challenge to the 
legitimacy of the regime. Their anti-government rhetoric 
has moderated since the death of Qutb and they have become 
very active both as a political party (when allowed) but 
more so as an non-governmental organization (NGO) providing 
services and charity to people across Egypt. 
 Around the time of President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
death in 1970, the Islamist movement in Egypt was gaining 
in strength yet was also polarizing between the moderate 
Islamists like the Brotherhood and the jihadi followers of 
Sayyid Qutb’s (among other Islamist leaders) writings. The 
1967 war with Israel had gone badly for then-President 
Nasser’s military and many of the Islamists placed the 
blame on the secular Egyptian government. In the years that 
followed, students began forming groups known as Gemaa (or 
Jamaa) Islamia or ‘Islamic Groups’, hereafter referred to 
as “Gemaa.” These groups gained momentum by offering “an 
‘Islamic solution’ to the social crisis that was affecting 
Egyptian universities at the time. In the 1970s, the 
numbers of (students) more than doubled while university 
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infrastructure remained unchanged.”38 The Nasser government 
had guaranteed such educations to people qualifying for 
them and then even guaranteed government employment. This 
obviously was a promise the government could not keep.  
 The Egyptian government and the Gemaa were allies 
until President Sadat flew to Jerusalem to hold peace talks 
with the Israeli government.39 After this time, the Gemaa 
and the government became increasingly at odds. Finally, 
the Sadat government arrested over one thousand political 
opponents in the fall of 1981. Shortly, thereafter an 
Egyptian Army lieutenant and brother of an imprisoned Gemaa 
leader assassinated President Sadat.40  
 Repressive actions after the death of Sadat did not 
stop the militant actions of Gemaa members. In the 1990s 
they were responsible for the killing of numerous tourists 
as well as anti-government actions. 
 Another group formed in 1971, out of the ideas 
established by Sayyid Qutb was Takfir wal Hijra (roughly 
translated as Denouncement and Holy Flight). The 
“denouncement” is in reference to the declaration that both 
Egyptian citizens and their government were infidels and 
were legitimate targets for jihad.41 The “Holy Flight” 
portion of the group’s name refers to the Prophet 
Mohammad’s flight from Mecca to Medina in order to both 
withdraw from “infidel society” and to establish and give 
military training to believers.42 
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 Takfir wal Hijra members have directly challenged the 
Egyptian state through attacks and assassinations. The 
state in turn has fought the group and execute some of its’ 
members. This group has changed names over time it is still 
active in Egypt. 
 The last major Islamist group discussed in this 
chapter for the purposes of this overview is al-Jihad. This 
group also formed in the 1970s. In contrast to Gemaa, al-
Jihad did not believe that preaching the Islamic message 
would be helpful until the impious regime had been 
destroyed and, overthrown and replaced by an Islamic 
state.43 This group’s leaders consisted of Ayman al-Zawahiri 
(now known as Osama bin-Laden’s deputy), and the notorious 
blind cleric, Shaykh Abd al-Rahman.44 Al-Jihad in similar 
fashion to other militant groups has endeavored to attack 
the state directly through assassinations and other 
destabilizing actions. Again the state violently repressed 
members when and where it could. Today, it is said that al-
Jihad and al-Qaeda have merged into one organization. 
 There are many other Islamist groups that have existed 
and still do today in Egypt. These smaller groups will be 
examined in following chapters as is applicable to the 
time-period of their existence. 
 
H. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
 This thesis will use a within case congruence 
procedure since the dependent and independent variables, 
the amount of political violence and the amount of 
political inclusion, have varied greatly over time in 
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Egypt. Resources used for this thesis will include books, 
journal articles, speech texts, and certain websites. 
 Particular attention will be given to the theories of 
Mohammed M. Hafez in his book Why Muslims Rebel: Repression 
and Resistance in the Islamic World. His conclusion is that 
there are two policy options for dealing with the 
governments in the Islamic world. The first option is to 
continue co-opting repressive authoritarian regimes, a 
“risky and morally objectionable choice.” Hafez argues that 
a better option is the second one which seeks accommodation 
with those Islamists “who will work through established 
rules of conflict resolution and political contestation.”45 
He concludes by stating that this requires “a delicate 
balance between institutional inclusion of moderates and 
targeted repression of radicals.”46 
 In order to look at Egypt as a study area, a 
chronological study of Islamism in that country will be 
accomplished. The study will focus on four historical 
periods from colonialism and King Farouk’s regime, through 
Presidents Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. 
 This study will begin with a focus on the early years 
of the Islamist movement Egypt starting with the founding 
of the Brotherhood in 1928. Thorough examinations of the 
motivations of Brotherhood leaders/thinkers like Hassan al-
Banna and Sayyid Qutb will be discussed to set the stage 
for Brotherhood doctrine and group motivation. Since a key 
reason for this group to form is their religion, the 
influence of Islam on the group will also be studied. 
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 After forming, the Brotherhood became a regional 
movement, establishing branches in multiple states 
throughout the Middle East. While this thesis’ focus is on 
Egypt, the nature of the Brotherhood does have an 
international aspect which needs to be considered. Not all 
members of the Brotherhood share the same visions as its 
leaders. As such some offshoots of the movement have split 
off into different Islamist groups including some violent 
groups. Thus other Islamist movements have historically 
competed with the Brotherhood for a foothold in Egypt. A 
discussion of these groups will differentiate the motives 
and methods of them. 
 Next, this section will focus on an examination of the 
relationship an examination of the relationship between 
Islamic violence and political inclusion during the Farouk 
regime.  
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 The second chapter will follow a chronological study 
of the Islamist movement in Egypt during the Nasser regime. 
The Brotherhood had sharp divisions with the government 
which brewed until a Muslim Brother assassinated Egypt’s 
Prime Minister in 1948. In retribution, the Brotherhood was 
banned and its founder, Hassan al-Banna was murdered 
(probably by the government) in 1949. The situation 
remained tense and Nasser survived an assassination attempt 
in 1954. Many Muslim Brothers were imprisoned until their 
release in 1964 when they plotted and carried out another 
assassination attempt on Nasser. The cycle of inclusion and 
exclusion continued until Nasser’s death in 1970. 
Obviously, the Brotherhood is the key movement that will be 
studied during this time period for specific examples for 
the extent of political inclusion and the resulting 
Islamist amount of violent or non-violent behavior.  
 Upon President Nasser’s death, Anwar Sadat was elected 
to the presidency. This will be the focus of Chapter Three. 
Similar to the Nasser years, government relations with 
Islamists were a cycle of political inclusion, political 
exclusion and a variety of violent political acts by the 
Islamists culminating in the assassination of President 
Sadat by an Islamist. Similar to chapter four, this chapter 
will do an in-depth study of the above-mentioned cycles. 
 Similarly to the previous two regimes, the Mubarak 
regime has had a mixed relationship with Islamists. Chapter 
Four will focus on cycles of inclusion and exclusion that 
were matched by cycles of violence and non-violence 
including assassination attempts on both Mubarak and his 
son (a possible successor to power). During Mubarak’s 
regime, Muslim Brothers have held seats in parliament 
although not as many as they might have had the elections 
been truly “free and fair.” This chapter will study the 
last twenty three years of Islamist-government interaction 
in Egypt as well as possibilities for the near future of 
Islamism there. 
The conclusion will contain a summary of the findings 
of the research. This will be followed by recommendations 
for Egypt as well as the Islamists in Egypt. Foreign policy 
recommendations for the United States regarding promotion 
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II.  THE NASSER ERA 
 
 During the Presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser, there 
were cycles of political inclusion and exclusion of 
Islamists, but mostly exclusion.  As with most governments 
and especially those that are non-democratic, the Nasser 
government had survival as its main goal. Anything that has 
or would jeopardize that goal was not tolerated by the 
government which used every instrument available to 
survive. This behavior by the government ultimately put it 
at odds with a least part of its population. In order to 
attempt to legitimize their behavior, regimes such as the 
one that existed in Egypt since once the British left, must 
explain their behavior. This type of regime is seen as 
often acting in a “schizophrenic” manner. This would 
seeming like to offer some freedom and democracy to their 
people but not enough to give the people an opportunity to 
change the government.47 Therefore, “as for those sectors of 
the population that are excluded and victimized, the 
schizophrenic stamp of the regime opens the ideological 
space within which they can express…their fundamental 
demand: the removal of the authoritarian regime and its 
replacement by a democratic one.”48 
 The Brotherhood is one of these excluded population 
sectors . Of course they are not without some blame since 
members or their offshoots had carried out anti-government 
attacks, both during King Farouk’s reign and later against 
Nasser’s government.  
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A. THE FREE OFFICERS COUP AND CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 
 In 1952, the Free Officers organization staged a coup 
and overthrew King Farouk, seen by many as a puppet of 
Great Britain. The Brotherhood had been vehemently opposed 
to the Farouk government in part due to its close 
relationship with colonial Britain but also because of 
repression of its members including the murder of its 
leader and founder al-Banna. Initially, the Brotherhood 
supported the Free Officers whom they worked with regarding 
the Palestine situation and whom were also against the 
Farouk government. This relationship changed after the coup 
put the Free Officers in power. In fact, “the Brotherhood 
went over to the opposition when it became clear that 
Nasser did not intend to establish an Islamic government. 
Nasser’s government clashed violently with the Brotherhood 
and suppressed it in 1954…”49 While the Nasser government 
and the Brotherhood shared the goal of eradicating the 
colonial British, they had little else in common. “…While 
Nasser portrayed his goals as consistent with Islamic 
precepts (a convergence readily affirmed by clerics on the 
government payroll), Islam did not figure prominently in 
either the formation or the justification of his agenda. 
…(his rhetoric was secular, nationalist, and revolutionary 
in tone…”50 A telling statement by Nasser would eventually 
highlight the differences between the Islamist’s goal of 
sharia and Nasser’s secular agenda. “After eighteen months 
in power, I still don’t see how it would be possible to 
govern according to the Koran...The Koran is a very general 
text, capable of interpretation, and that is why I don’t 
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think its suitable as a source of policy or political 
doctrine.”51 
 The Brotherhood had a considerable following by the 
1950s and as such, had a broad powerbase across the 
country. They had even started many groups of young men 
called “rovers” that held a paramilitary status all across 
the country.52 Shortly after Nasser consolidated his power 
as the leader of Egypt, he recognized the Brotherhood as a 
growing presence and possible to challenge his regime. “The 
latest threat to the regime came from the Ikhwan (Muslim 
Brotherhood) and their assassination attempt on Nasser in 
October 1954. They were crushed and by the end of the year, 
the RCC (Revolutionary Command Council, the new name for 
the Free Officers) had undisputed powers.”53 After wresting 
power from General Mohammed Naguib, Nasser ruled as Egypt’s 
leader until his death from natural causes in 1970.  
 
B. THE SUEZ CANAL CRISIS AND THE WAR OF 1956 
 As President Nasser was trying to consolidate his 
power across Egypt, he was challenged by the popularity of 
the Brotherhood that was well entrenched in both civil 
society and in the military. 
 To Nasser’s credit, he reached an agreement with the 
British regarding the withdrawal of British troops from 
Egypt including the canal zone. This was a fortunate move 
on his part as the removal of foreign power from Egyptian 
land was wildly popular with the Egyptian people.54 Due to 
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this new development, the government’s power grew while the 
Islamist Brotherhood became marginalized, especially after 
their failed assassination attempt.  
 Less than two years after Nasser got the British to 
agree to leave Egypt, he decided to go one step further and 
nationalized the Suez Canal zone in 1956. This led to a 
international crisis and ensuing war with the French, 
British and Israelis on one side and Egypt on the other. 
Outside pressure was present however from both the United 
States and Russia for an end to the conflict and the war 
ended abruptly with Nasser retaining the canal and again 
gaining popular Egyptian support.55 This further 
marginalized public sympathies with the Brotherhood and 
entrenched Nasser’s popularity for years to come. 
 
C. THE BROTHERHOOD FORCED UNDERGROUND 
 Nasser banned the Brotherhood in 1954.56  Not only were 
they prohibited from associating freely, but many of its 
leaders were imprisoned.57 This repressive action may be 
seen as an indication of the actual power of the Ikhwan to 
motivate and recruit certain segments of Egyptian society. 
Even though the Ikhwan had been banned in 1954, they 
remained an active underground movement. While they 
retained their social contacts, they were for the most part 
underground until the mid-1960s. The Brotherhood were 
however, “…virtually the only Islamic political 
organization in Egypt until 1967, excluding the Shabab 
Muhammad’s group, the marginal and short-lived Jihad group 
of 1958, and those members of the Association of Islamic 
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Preaching who were politicized and radicalized under the 
influence of Sayyid Qutb in the early and mid-1960s.”58 
Other Islamist groups would emerge shortly after Nasser’s 
death during the Sadat era. 
 
D. THE BROTHERHOOD RADICALIZES UNDER REPRESSION 
 Sayyid Qutb was an important Islamist leader in that 
he closely followed the teachings of the founder of the 
Ikhwan, Hassan al-Banna. Qutb was actually educated in 
Colorado in the United States and, “was shocked at the 
cultural differences between his native Egypt and Colorado. 
After attending various social events and seeing what he 
believed to be moral decadence in the West, Qutb actually 
became a more religiously observant Muslim.”59 In his 
writings, Qutb describes Americans as being violent by 
nature and as having little respect for human life... 
American churches were not places of worship as much as 
entertainment centers and playgrounds for the sexes. 
Americans, according to Qutb, were primitive in their 
sexual life, as illustrated in the words of an American 
female college student who told him that the sexual issue 
was not ethical, but merely biological.60 
 Qutb’s version of Islamism was particularly radical in 
that it called all “true believers” to Jihad. He and his 
followers became a radicalized segment of the Brotherhood 
and took al-Banna’s writings a step further than? his own 
writings. In Milestones, Qutb describes his modern version 
of Jahiliyya. Qutb defines this as, “…the worship of some 
people by others; that is to say, some people become 
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dominant and make laws for others, regardless of whether 
these laws are against God’s injunctions and without caring 
for the use or misuse of their authority.”61 A more 
classical definition of Jahiliyya refers to an “age of 
ignorance.”62 This is otherwise known in the Muslim world as 
the time before Muhammad was called upon by Allah to be his 
prophet. This was a time period in Arabia when polytheism 
was prevalent and the Ka`ba shine in Mecca contained images 
of 360 different gods.63  
 Qutb defines his version of Islamist thinking and 
action further by stating that, “Islam cannot accept any 
mixing with Jahiliyyah, either in its concept or in the 
modes of living which are derived from this concept.”64 Qutb 
writes that jihaad (or jihad) is the Quranic way of 
removing a government that is Jahiliyyah. He describes how 
Mohammed used jihad to further his cause during the days 
when he was still alive and introducing the ideas of Islam. 
Qutb, states that he and his followers will and should use 
jihad to remove any Jahiliyya leaders (Nasser included) 
under the following explanation: “This movement uses the 
methods of preaching and persuasion for reforming ideas and 
beliefs; and it uses physical power and jihaad for 
abolishing the organizations and authorities of the Jahili 
system,  which  prevents people from reforming their ideas 
and beliefs but forces them to obey their erroneous ways 
and make them serve human lords instead of the Almighty 
Lord.”65  
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E. THE BROTHERHOOD CHALLENGES THE GOVERNMENT 
 Perhaps the most striking difference between Sayyid 
Qutb and earlier Egyptian Islamists like Hassan al-Banna 
was his willingness to confront the regime head-on in an 
overt manner. While the Hassan al-Banna’s Ikhwan did create 
the militant secret wing in the 1940s known as the Special 
Order,66 they did not overtly challenge the legitimacy of 
the government as a matter of discourse but rather through 
acts of terrorism. Qutb on the other hand openly declared 
that Muslim elites and governments were “atheists against 
whom all true believers should wage holy war.”67 These words 
were meant to galvanize support for Qutb’s views against 
what he saw as an unrighteous, secular government. 
 When another attempt was made on Nasser’s life in 
1965, the Brotherhood (and Qutb) bore the brunt of the 
blame. They were “massively and ruthlessly suppressed by 
the government. Qutb and several other leaders were 
arrested and executed and thousands of Brothers were 
arrested and tortured, while others went underground or 
fled the country.”68 After a trial, Qutb was hanged on 
August 29, 1966.69 While this event was protested by the 
Brotherhood at the time, it went relatively unnoticed in 
the media. Qutb’s writing however, would later be 
recognized as a vital contribution to the Islamist cause, 
and parallel to other key Islamist figures such as Mawlana 
Mawdudi of Pakistan and Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran.70 
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F. NASSER SUCCESSFULLY MARGINALIZES THE ISLAMISTS 
 President Nasser’s government was secular to be sure, 
however he still remained a Muslim and attempted to use his 
status as a Muslim as a means to consolidate power. This is 
in contrast to Mustafa Kemal’s (Ataturk) secular regime in 
Turkey. Kemal believed that the reason for the Ottoman 
empire’s failure was at least partially due to the failure 
to keep up with the west due to adherence to Islam and 
Muslim traditions. As such, Kemal made it very difficult 
for devout Muslims in Turkey after he came to power.  
 In contrast to his successor, the self-styled, 
“believer-president,” Nasser believed in a minimal role for 
Islam and none at all in the government (unless it was 
controlling the mosques and clerics). A good example to 
demonstrate Nasser’s perspective is his discussion during a 
National Assembly of the United Arab Republic Foreign 
Relations Committee when he stated, “the religious element 
should enter into our relations with other countries only 
in cultural affairs.”71 This context of this conversation 
was regarding whether religion could play a role in joining 
Muslim countries in a united effort to deal with Western 
nations.  
 When the issue of a new caliphate was brought up to 
Nasser, he stated that, “…the caliphate is an historical 
stage whose purposes have come and gone and any discussion 
of it in current circumstances is a waste of time.”72 Most 
likely these comments, given in 1954, were a catalyst to 
the Brotherhood’s assassination attempt on Nasser’s life 
later that year. Interestingly, this retribution attack was 
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likely carried out by the secret Special Order faction of 
the Brotherhood, which after al-Banna’s death was not 
controlled by the Brotherhood’s new Supreme Guide, Hassan 
el-Hodeibi.73 Since the reintroduction of a caliph as ruler 
of the Muslim world was a primary goal, President Nasser’s 
discounting the idea of a modern caliphate may have been 
viewed by members of the Ikhwan as heresy. To the most 
violent ones, it may have been a motivating factor in the 
assassination attempt.  
  While the early years of the Nasser regime saw few 
acts of political violence by Islamists, during the latter 
part of his administration, Islamism did stage a comeback. 
There are numerous dynamics that acted upon the situation. 
According to Wickham, “He (Nasser) banned all opposition 
groups and imposed state control over sites where they had 
formerly reached out to the mass public. At the same time, 
the regime robbed such groups of a key constituency through 
the co-optation of educated, lower-middle-class youth.”74 
These tactics were not violently opposed by the Islamists 
for the two reasons mentioned above however this required a 
more in-depth examination. First, when Nasser banned all 
opposition groups, he did so from a position of strength 
and charisma. The Free Officers and consequently the RCC 
was the first group that had successfully staged a 
revolution and actually put Egyptians in charge of Egypt 
for the first time in centuries. Nasser was a very 
charismatic person which, coupled with the success of the 
coup made him popular among Egyptians. 
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G. NASSER’S SOCIALIST ECONOMIC AGENDA 
 Nasser began lowering university fees and tuition and 
eventually made university education virtually free of 
charge. After their university educations were complete, 
the graduates were guaranteed comfortable government jobs. 
It is hard to mobilize popular support against such a 
generous regime. This time the ideas of the Islamists could 
not compete with the socialist programs of the government 
that were very popular at the time and across the Arab 
world.  
 The problem with all of these government benefits is 
that over time, they became unsustainable in Egypt and the 
people’s devotion to Nasser waned. The economic problems, 
coupled with the disaster in the 1967 war with Israel left 
a place for the Islamists to identify with certain 
Egyptians and stage a comeback. 
 Not only had Egypt done badly in the “Six-Day War” but 
they had been spending nearly twenty-five percent of 
national income on defense spending, exacerbating the 
economic problems already facing Egypt.75 These failures 
militarily and economically would eventually give the 
Islamists an audience ready to hear a different perspective 
than that of Arab nationalism or Nasserism. 
 
 
H. CONCLUSION—NASSER’S LEADERSHIP SUSTAINED THE 
CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 
 
 While all of these problems may have helped Islamists 
to organize, it was still difficult for them. According to 
Diane Singerman, “Islamist movements cannot easily organize 
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mass, centralized, bureaucratic organizations; their 
governments will not let them. Their sympathizers may 
increase, but the resources for repression at the hands of 
the Egyptian, (and other) governments are huge.”76 This is 
one of the central arguments of Eva Bellin regarding why 
democracy has a tough time taking hold in modern Arab 
states. She argues that when authoritarian regimes maintain 
such a robust style of government with well-funded military 
and police as well as a strong base of international 
support, amongst other factors, the likelihood of democracy 
occurring is small.77  
 In the case of the Egyptian government during the 
Nasser regime, it is difficult to argue the counter to the 
theory central to this study: governments politically 
isolating themselves from the people, not allowing 
participation and repressing certain groups seen as a 
challenge to the government, will ultimately lead some 
anti-government citizens to take violent action in the 
absence of other means of action being made available to 
them. The Islamists (or any other group) were never 
democratically included in the political arena during the 
Nasser era in Egypt. 
 When Gamal Abdel Nasser died in 1970, he left Anwar 
Sadat with myriad problems including: high unemployment, 
disenfranchised college graduates that were promised 
government jobs only to be rewarded with years of wait, a 
corrupt bureaucracy and a socialist system that was not 
working for most Egyptians. When Sadat became the president 
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after Nasser’s death, these issues could not be ignored by 
the Egyptian government thus putting certain reforms to 
address these issues on the top of Sadat’s “to-do” list.  
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III. THE SADAT ERA  
 
 Upon President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s death in 1970, his 
vice president, Anwar al-Sadat, succeeded him as the 
President of Egypt. When Sadat first came to power, he, 
“seemed content to rule in the shadow of Nasser, as was 
symbolized by the placement of his picture in public places 
and government offices alongside of, not in place of, 
Nasser’s.”78 Sadat however, was more religious than was 
Nasser. Nasser seemed to be acting out his Muslim “duties,” 
such as the Hajj and daily prayers, in an effort to 
maintain a following of faithful Muslims, rather than as a 
sincere act of worship. Sadat, on the other hand was 
regarded as a more devout Muslim. He even termed himself 
the “Believer-President.” As an example of Egyptian 
society’s early views of Sadat, a university professor and 
Islamic activist, Hasan Hanafi observed: 
 
President Sadat has been given the title “the 
Believer-President.” He is always called by his 
first name Muhammad. He is shown in the mass 
media in his white jallabiya, going to the mosque 
or coming out of it, with a rosary in one hand, 
Moses stick in the other, and with a prayer mark 
on his forehead…He murmurs in prayer, closes his 
eyes and shows signs of humility and devotion. He 
begins his speeches with “In the name of God,” 
and ends them with Quranic verses signifying 
modesty and asking for forgiveness.79 
 
While President Nasser saw the Brotherhood as a definite 
challenge to his authority, especially during the early 
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years of his regime, Sadat had always been somewhat 
sympathetic to their cause. 
 
A. SADAT’S HISTORY WITH THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
 Interestingly, Sadat’s connection with the Brotherhood 
began before the Free Officers overthrew King Farouk in 
1952. As early as 1940, the Free Officers had tried to form 
an alliance with the Brotherhood. Then-Colonel Anwar al-
Sadat made contact (as a representative of the Free 
Officers) with Hassan al-Banna in order to consider allying 
with the Brotherhood against the government. Both sides saw 
possible benefits in enlarging their powerbase for a future 
coup attempt. Sadat and al-Banna continued to meet 
occasionally for the next two years.80 Their discussions 
likely focused on their anti-colonial thoughts and ways to 
both rid Egypt of the British and to install a regime 
palatable both to the Brotherhood and to the military. 
 In 1942, Colonel Sadat was arrested for his continued 
contact with German agents.81 His meetings with them were no 
doubt an effort to garner Germany’s favor and remove the 
British from Egypt. In the context of the Second World War, 
the British were very protective of their influence in 
Egypt and control of it and the Suez Canal for strategic 
reasons. The British had been fighting General Rommel’s 
German army in the deserts of North Africa and were in 
danger of losing the region to the Nazis. As such any 
Egyptian suspected of collusion with the enemies of Britain 
was taken out of circulation and imprisoned. 
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 Sadat escaped from prison in November of 1944 and 
almost immediately resumed his meetings with Hasan al-
Banna. During this time al-Banna made an interesting 
request of Sadat. Al-Banna asked if Sadat might arrange a 
meeting between King Farouk and himself in order to 
reconcile their differences. Sadat used his influence with 
a friend, King Farouk’s physician who did bring the matter 
up to the king in 1945. The king rebuffed the idea however 
and the matter never went any further.82 
 Initially, al-Banna wanted the Free Officers to join 
the militant wing of the Brotherhood which would have meant 
they would have had to swear an oath of allegiance to al-
Banna. Of course the Free Officers never did so. The two 
groups kept communication lines open but each had its own 
vision for the future of Egypt. These visions diverged, 
with the Brotherhood’s goal of an Islamic state standing in 
contrast of the secular views of key Free Officers. As 
Harris wrote, “…it is apparent from Colonel al-Sadat’s 
account that each group was extremely wary of the other, 
and that each group sought to augment its own strength with 
the help of the other.”83 After the 1940s the Brotherhood 
never really had as close a relationship with either the 
Free Officers or the Egyptian government. The secular 
governments have had different goals and a different vision 
of Egypt’s future than the Brotherhood.  
 Important to the environment during President Sadat’s 
rule are the effects of the 1967 war with Israel. The 
Israelis badly defeated the Arab armies and the Islamists 
stated that the Arab armies’ defeat was due to their 
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government’s lack of proper religiousness and piety, in 
contrast to the Israelis who were faithful to their 
religion and God. Therefore they had God on their side. In 
the years following the 1967 war, some of the Brotherhood 
began to become disillusioned with the compromises and 
moderate stance of the organization and broke off into 
their own groups. 
 
B. SADAT, THE NASSERISTS AND ISLAMISM 
 Sadat inherited specific situations upon Nasser’s 
death in 1970 that influenced the course of events. Nasser 
had the liberal policy of providing free education for 
Egyptian youth at the universities and providing them with 
comfortable government jobs upon graduation. This was 
Nasser’s way of including the populace, but he did not 
appreciate that this policy set a standard which could not 
be maintained. While the university system could grow to 
accommodate more students, the government bureaucracy could 
not, even when salaries were frozen during periods of 
inflation. Jobs were created when there was no need. 
Eventually, the government had to make people wait to 
obtain government employment after graduation. Some that 
were eventually able to find work in the government had 
waited at least ten years. Others realized that they would 
not find meaningful work and took jobs that were “beneath” 
their social status. While President Nasser received public 
adoration for his programs, President Sadat had to pay the 
price of breaking the truth to the populace that the 
government could no longer sustain these programs. 
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 At the time of President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s death 
and Sadat’s rise to the presidency in 1970, the 
Nasserists in the government still wielded considerable 
power. Sadat had never really bought in to Nasser’s 
socialism and Arab nationalism ideologies. Shortly after 
becoming the president he perceived a challenge to his 
authority by the Nasserists that remained in the 
government. In a move that surprised many, Sadat carried 
out his “corrective revolution” on 15 May of 1971.84 Sadat’s 
former vice president and over 100 other Nasserists were 
arrested and charged with plotting to overthrow Sadat’s 
government. Many of these men had resigned their government 
positions in the days before the arrests, possibly in 
preparation for a coup against Sadat. Regardless, any 
activities they intended to take against Sadat were 
preempted by their arrests and imprisonment.85  
 In conjunction with his corrective revolution, Sadat 
began to co-opt some of Egypt’s Islamists feeing some from 
prison and encouraging the development of Islamist student 
groups. In retrospect, this was definitely a maneuver to 
balance the political power of any remaining Nasserists. At 
the same time Egyptian Islamism became notably polarized 
between the moderate Islamists like the Brotherhood and the 
jihadi followers of Sayyid Qutb’s (among other Islamist 
leaders) writings. New freedom for the Islamists paved the 
way for a new direction for the Brotherhood. They spoke out 
against violence86 and tried to change Egypt by altering the 
individual’s view of the state. To this end, they provided 
more education and services for Egyptians.  
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C. THE VIOLENT FRINGE OF EGYTIAN ISLAMISM 
 Some of the Islamists broke with the Brotherhood when 
they became impatient with the Brotherhood’s increasingly 
moderate policies. Some of these spin-off groups included: 
the Shabab Muhammad group, the Jama’t al-Muslimin (Society 
of Muslims) also known as al-Takfir Wal-Hijra 
(Excommunication and Holy Migration), hereafter referred to 
simply as Takfir, and al-Jihad. Members of the latter would 
eventually assassinate President Sadat. All three of these 
groups carried out violent attacks against targets in Egypt 
during Sadat’s rule. According to Mohammed Hafez, “both 
(Shabab Muhammad and Takfir) of these organizations adopted 
a distinctively radical ideology and engaged in violent 
activities against the state. However their violence was 
limited to a few noteworthy incidents and both quickly 
succumbed to state repression.”87 Probably the largest 
Islamist group in Egypt during the 1970s in addition to the 
Brotherhood was the Gemaa Islamiyya or Gemaa.  
 Adding to the Islamists’ anti-government sentiments 
was the failure of the 1967 war with Israel for then-
President Nasser’s military, for which blame was placed on 
the secular government. In the year after President Nasser 
died, Sadat began to release most Brotherhood members that 
Nasser had imprisoned years earlier.88 By this, Sadat was 
hoping to create legitimacy and co-opt from the Islamists. 
In addition to this act of “good-will,” Sadat also promoted 
the building of mosques and supported the creation of 
Islamic student organizations or Gemaa, on university 
campuses to counter the influence of the Nasserites and 
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other leftist organizations.89 These groups gained momentum 
by offering “an ‘Islamic solution’ to the social crisis 
that was affecting Egyptian universities at the time. In 
the 1970s, the numbers of (students) more than doubled 
while university infrastructure remained unchanged.”90 Sadat 
encouraged the growth of the Gemaa in order to counter his 
political opponents. Sadat gave support to these new Gemaa 
by instructing members of the Egyptian government to 
“create an Islamic tayyar (movement),” and stating, “I want 
us to raise Muslim boys, and to spend money on them, so 
they can become our anchor in the University.”91 Sadat’s 
followers did help some of the new Gemaa by “organizing 
summer camps for university students.”92  
 The Gemaa would eventually become popular enough to 
win the elections across the country. This included 
elections at the faculty, university, and national levels. 
This demonstrates a move away from socialism toward the 
ideas of the Islamists as student and instructors such as 
Cairo University’s faculty of engineering made this 
ideological shift.93 
 These student groups would eventually become strong in 
Egypt and form a powerful group. This Gemaa Islamiya 
eventually turned into a jihadi group with the now 
notorious blind cleric, Sheikh Abdul al-Rahman, as their 
spiritual leader.94 Sheikh al-Rahman is currently serving a 
prison sentence in the United States after being convicted 
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in the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center 
buildings in New York.  
 The elation of the newly freed Islamists and their 
recent recruits quickly turned to agitation against Israel. 
They pressed the Sadat government to take military action, 
not only to expel the Israelis from the Sinai Peninsula 
which was lost during the 1967 war, but also to recapture 
Jerusalem for all the umma(i.e. the worldwide Islamic 
community). In line with Islamist wishes, Sadat attacked 
Israel in 1973. This at first appeared to produce success 
for the Egyptians, however the Israeli military turned the 
tables and surrounded the Egyptian Third Army in the middle 
of the Sinai Peninsula. As a consequence, the attack on 
Israel was lauded by the Islamists, but the results were 
mixed for Egypt. 
 The Egyptian government and the Gemaa were allies 
until President Sadat flew to Jerusalem to hold peace talks 
with the Israeli government.95 After this time, the Gemaa 
and the government became increasingly at odds. Finally, 
the Sadat government arrested over one thousand political 
opponents in the fall of 1981. Shortly thereafter, an 
Egyptian Army Lieutenant and brother of an imprisoned Gemaa 
leader, assassinated President Sadat.96  
 A different Islamist group formed in 1971, out of the 
ideas established by Sayyid Qutb was Takfir wal Hijra 
(roughly translated as Denouncement and Holy Flight). The 
“denouncement” is in reference to the declaration that both 
Egyptian citizens and their government were infidels and 
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were legitimate targets for jihad.97 The “Holy Flight” 
portion of the group’s name refers to the Prophet 
Mohammad’s flight from Mecca to Medina in order to both 
withdraw from “infidel society” and to establish and give 
military training to believers.98 
 Takfir wal Hijra members have directly challenged the 
Egyptian state through military attacks and assassinations. 
The state in turn fought the group and executed some of 
its’ members. The group has changed names over time and is 
still active in Egypt. 
 The last major Islamist group discussed for the 
purposes of this overview is al-Jihad. This group also 
formed in the 1970s. In contrast to Gemaa Islamia, al-Jihad 
did not believe that preaching the Islamic message would be 
helpful until the impious regime had been destroyed, 
overthrown, and replaced by an Islamic state.99 This group’s 
leaders consisted of Ayman al-Zawahiri (Osama bin-Laden’s 
deputy), and the notorious blind cleric, Shaykh Abd al-
Rahman.100  Al-Jihad, in similar fashion to other militant 
groups, has tried to attack the state directly through 
assassinations and other destabilizing actions. Again the 
state violently repressed members when and where it could. 
Today, it is alleged that al-Jihad and al-Qaeda have merged 
into one organization. 
 While President Nasser did not allow full 
participation of all political groups in elections, he did 
allow some. He may have thought that “something is better 
than nothing,” but this could have been mistaken. Allowing 
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certain groups to have power and prestige separated them 
from other groups which were marginalized by the regime. 
This created fissures in the stability of Egypt that would 
eventually lead to deeper cracks in the fiber of society. 
In addition to the political situation in Egypt, there were 
a few other conditions that Nasser created and Sadat 
inherited that would eventually set his regime up for 
internal strife. 
 
D. ECONOMIC CHALLENGES GENERATE UNREST 
 Alongside the challenges of free education and 
guaranteed government jobs for college graduates were 
drastic economic changes during Sadat’s presidency. While 
Egypt does have some oil reserves, most of their income 
during the oil boom in the Middle East came in the form of 
worker remittances. Egypt’s plethora of unemployed educated 
workers migrated to the Gulf States and Libya to seek 
lucrative employment positions in the oil industry. Workers 
sent large portions of their pay back to Egypt where it 
infused the economy. Statistically, Egypt’s gross domestic 
product grew at an average rate of 9 percent annually 
between 1974 and 1984. This had the effect of doubling the 
per capita income, raising it from $334 to $700 over this 
same time period.101 While much of this income was 
integrated into normal state-run coffers, some of it went 
into new Islamic banks and investment companies. Wickham 
states that this “private economy was effectively 
controlled by eighteen families and their close associates; 
Brotherhood members accounted for eight. Another study also 
calculated that Brotherhood interest might control more 
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than 40 percent of all economic ventures, many of them 
centered on real estate and currency speculation.”102 The 
effect of this was that Islamists controlled considerable 
financial resources, a trend which began during the Sadat 
presidency. This fiscal clout makes the government less 
able to simply ignore the Islamists as their influence on 
Egypt’s economy cannot be understated. 
 In late 1976, Sadat’s government suffered a setback 
due to Nasser’s previous socialist economic policies, which 
proved popular amongst the public and politically difficult 
to retract. Food in Egypt was heavily subsidized by the 
government. The rapid population growth of the urban poor 
dependent upon these food subsidies, coupled with the 
government’s guarantee of jobs to college graduates, left 
the government saddled with debt. Even the infusion of cash 
into the economy due to the oil boom in the Middle East was 
not enough to overcome these difficulties. Sadat believed 
that his only option at the time was to turn to the World 
Bank for loans to pay off some of its debt. In order to 
satisfy the World Bank the Sadat government announced an 
end to the food subsidies as well as a freeze on government 
bonuses and pay increases.103 The Egyptian public’s reaction 
was swift and violent. There was heavy rioting across the 
country and the army had to be used to quell the riots. 
Rioters targeted government offices and signs of wealth and 
corruption across the country (such as large cars). In the 
city of Cairo, seventy-seven people were killed due to the 
rioting.104 This time, the anti-government violence won out 
(except for those killed during the rioting), and Sadat 
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rescinded his orders. Eventually however, Sadat slowly re-
enacted his orders to carry out these World Bank 
recommendations. Interestingly, Sadat blamed the Egyptian 
Marxists for the riots and hundreds of them were 
arrested.105 While the outcome of this event was a real 
economic change for Sadat and Egypt, this was a definite 
blow to his popularity. 
 Nineteen seventy-seven continued to be a violent year 
across Egypt. In July of that year, members of the militant 
Islamist group Takir wal-Hijra kidnapped a prominent 
cleric, Husayn al-Dhahabi. Al-Dhahabi was a teacher at the 
famous al-Azhar University and had also been a former 
Minister of Religious Endowments. After the Takfir’s 
demands were not met, al-Dhahabi was murdered. The Egyptian 
government retaliated by executing the leaders of both the 
Takfir and the Shabab Muhammad. Additionally many members 
of these groups were tried by military courts and 
imprisoned.106  
 
E. ELECTION LAW REFORM 
 Even though some political freedoms such as voting had 
been allowed in Egypt, the Sadat government kept 
implementing new laws to keep control of the government 
firmly in its grasp. In June of 1977 a bill was passed in 
the Assembly which, “stipulated that no party would be 
allowed to function unless it had twenty parliamentary 
members, an obvious move to silence the opposition.”107 
Electoral law manipulation such as this has frequently been 
used to change the political outcome of elections to suit 
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the needs of the government, not just in Egypt but around 
the world where authoritarian regimes have the power to 
change electoral law. 
 
F. WAR AND PEACE WITH ISRAEL 
 What is widely regarded as one of the Islamist’s 
biggest critiques of Sadat was his peace with Israel. While 
the 1973 war was immensely popular with the Islamists, the 
peace treaty resulting after the war was not. After all, 
the Brotherhood had historically fought with the 
Palestinians and had ultimate designs of unifying the umma. 
This umma includes all Muslims including the Palestinian 
people. Nasser while a socialist, at least had a goal of 
unifying Muslim Arabs under the United Arab Republic (UAR) 
banner. Sadat on the other hand was more concerned with 
Egypt proper. In fact, a trend Sadat encouraged was that of 
“Egypt First.” To demonstrate this, Sadat changed the 
official name of the country to the Arab Republic of 
Egypt.108 This “downsizing” of the goal of a unified Muslim 
Arab cause may have disappointed the Islamists, due to 
their dream of reunifying the umma under a caliphate. 
 In April of 1974, the Islamist militant group Shabab 
Muhammed (a spin-off group from the Brotherhood) 
successfully captured the Technical Military Academy in 
Cairo. While underground groups had not been specifically 
targeted for repression during this time, they were indeed 
outlawed by the government. Their lack of patience with the 
government compared with their relatively moderate 
Brotherhood parent organization. The government was thus 
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galvanized against them. The Shabab’s coup attempt was 
stopped rather quickly and the government restored order to 
the area.109  
 In November of 1977, Sadat made his historic visit to 
Jerusalem to make peace with the Israelis.110 This was of 
course criticized by the Islamists as peace was akin to 
giving in to the Zionists and giving them the holy city 
containing the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Following further unrest by 
Islamist students Sadat took numerous key actions over the 
next few years which would limit the political activity of 
the Islamists. The first was to pass “vice” laws which made 
it illegal to criticize the regime.111 Next, when faced with 
increasing unrest from young Islamists and students, Sadat 
decreed the dissolution of student unions, known to be a 
hotbed for Islamist activity and recruiting.112 This is 
telling for Sadat’s grip on power in Egypt, since Sadat 
himself was partly responsible for the formation of Gemaa 
groups to balance the power of the Nasserists early in his 
presidency. 
 
G. THE SPIRAL OF UNREST, REPRESSION AND VIOLENCE 
 Finally, in 1981, events came to a violent climax in 
Egypt. Coptic Christians and Muslims fought each other, 
both blaming the government for not fixing the situation. 
Sadat made his most sweeping repressive gestures during 
that time. The Coptic Pope Shenouda was suspended from his 
office, the Brotherhood and thirteen religious 
organizations were declared to be illegal, over sixty-five 
                                                 
109 Esposito and Voll, 174. 
110 Hopwood, 115. 
111 Ibid., 115. 
 54
112 Wickham, 66. 
mosques were taken over by the government and over 1,500 
people were arrested. There were even signs of the 
government crumbling from within when Sadat’s premier 
Mustafa Khalil, and his government resigned. Further 
feeding the Islamist movement, Sadat ordered a mass arrest 
of over 1,500 more religious activists.113 This repression 
was a sign that Sadat either no longer needed the Islamists 
to balance the power of the Nasserists or that they were 
becoming too powerful and might challenge Sadat’s 
government for power. A small group of these men (members 
of al-Jihad) finally had reached a breaking point and 
assassinated President Anwar Al-Sadat on October 6, 1981 
while he watched a military parade.114 This escalation and 
culmination of violence came years after the Sadat regime 
repressed the Islamist movement in Egypt, and prevented 
them from access to government institutions with real 
decision-making power. By this observation I do not 
apologize for Islamists act of political violence, but 
rather attempt to understand the turn to political 
violence. Such a turn often comes when groups are denied 
other avenues of influence in the government. 
 In conclusion, Sadat’s regime did begin by attempting 
to win over the Islamists, freeing them from prison and 
encouraging some of their activities since they balanced 
the Nasserists. Over time however, the Islamists grew 
impatient with Sadat’s rhetoric, repression, and lack of 
political inclusion. Most actions that the Islamists took, 
whether violent or not, were seen by the Sadat regime as a 
challenge to his regime. Thus Sadat decided to repress 
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them. This conclusion supports the thesis of this study, 
that repression of Islamists has a direct relationship to 
their eventual targeting of the government with political 
violence. While compelling, definite proof of this thesis 
would require an example of true political inclusion of the 
Islamists, which did not occur during the Sadat era.  
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IV. THE MUBARAK ERA 
 
 President Anwar Sadat had been reviewing a troop 
procession celebrating the anniversary of the crossing of 
the Suez Canal on 6 October of 1981 when suddenly, Army 
Lieutenant Khalid Ahmad Shawqi al-Islambouli and some other 
soldiers suddenly attacked the reviewing party as they 
looked on.115 President Sadat was killed as well as seven 
other people in the reviewing stand. Vice President Hosni 
Mubarak was among the twenty-eight people injured.116  
 This assassination occurred one month after Sadat had 
rounded up and imprisoned over one thousand political 
opponents. One of those arrested, imprisoned and tortured 
was a Gemaa leader named Muhammad al-Islambouli, the 
brother of Sadat’s assassin.117 The day after Sadat’s death, 
the People’s Assembly nominated Mubarak to succeed Sadat as 
president. Mubarak was elected and took office on the 13 
October, 1981.118 Mubarak promised to follow in Sadat’s 
footsteps and manner of leadership making no major changes 
in the day to day operations of the government of Egypt. 
 Mubarak was born into an upper middle class family. He 
joined the air force in 1950, became a pilot and successful 
leader. He was trained as a pilot in the Soviet Union and 
was appointed to command the bomber forces during the Yemen 
civil war from 1962 through 1967.119 He progressed through 
the ranks until he become Chief of Staff in 1969 and then 
the commander in chief in 1972. Sadat valued his 
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relationship with Mubarak and as such gave him key 
governmental positions including the deputy minister of war 
before finally appointing him to be vice president in 
1975.120  
 
A. MUBARAK’S FIRST YEARS IN OFFICE 
 Following Mubarak’s election to fill Sadat’s shoes as 
the President of Egypt, a first order of business was to 
seek justice for the assassination attack. Lieutenant 
Islambouli and members of his group confessed to the 
killings and were not remorseful. During his confession, 
Lt. Islambouli stated, “I killed him but I am not guilty. I 
did what I did for the sake of religion and of my country. 
I killed the pharaoh.”121  
 Islambouli and his co-conspirators were members of the 
Islamist group al-Jihad and followed the leadership of an 
electrical engineer named Abdessalam Faraj. Faraj was a 
follower of the teachings of Sayyid Qutb who advocated 
militant action against what he saw as jahiliyya or impious 
governments and leaders. As such, Faraj wrote a pamphlet 
translated as The Hidden Imperative or The Missing 
Obligation. The subject of this obligation was “the ulema’s 
obligation to declare jihad against any ruler failing to 
implement the precepts of Islam, even if he calls himself a 
Muslim. In Faraj’s view, the religious clerics of Egypt had 
betrayed their trust.”122 In the eyes of al-Jihad, this 
betrayal of trust allowed persons in the organization to 
make their own judgments and rulings against the government 
                                                 
120 Encyclopedia of the Orient. “Hosni Mubarak” [http://i-cias.com/e.o/mubarak.htm]. Accessed 31 Aug 
2004. 
121 Hopwood 183. 
 58
122 Kepel, 86. 
that in this case called for the overthrow of the 
government including the assassination of Sadat. Faraj 
declared Jihad against the government and President Sadat 
calling him an “apostate of Islam fed at the tables of 
imperialism and Zionism.”123 Interestingly, Faraj was 
equally critical of moderate Islamists such as the 
Brotherhood. Al-Jihad viewed the Brothers as a group that 
only served to strengthen the Egyptian government by 
participating in a political process. Al-Jihad’s group view 
was that the government did not intend to share power with 
any Islamists.  
 Shortly after Sadat’s assassination, al-Jihad cells 
initiated numerous attacks around Egypt in an attempt to 
overthrow the government. The 1979 Iranian revolution was 
still on the mind of many in the Middle East, and the 
Egyptian Islamists were no exception. The attacks following 
Sadat’s death were intended to create an anti-government 
uprising across Egypt, in turn causing a revolution. Al-
Jihad had planned to capture the radio and television 
stations in Cairo in order to announce the start of the 
revolution. As history shows, however, they were not 
successful in capturing the station and the coup attempt 
failed. Nonetheless, small riots occurred around the 
country in the days following, particularly in Asyut in 
Upper Egypt.124  
 Shortly after the government regained control of the 
situation, thousands of al-Jihad members were arrested. 
More than three hundred were charged with murder and other 
high crimes, including attempted overthrow of the 
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government. On 15 April 1982 five of the assassins were 
executed by firing squad or hanging. Later that year the 
government passed sentence on eighty-nine other 
conspirators with prison terms ranging from three years to 
life in prison. In a show of defiance, the one-hundred 
seventy-four people acquitted staged a demonstration 
outside the prison upon their release and were heard 
changing, “Islamic revolution is coming.”125 
 While Mubarak did voice his commitment to the policies 
of Sadat, he actually made some conciliatory moves toward 
militants and dissidents in 1982 by releasing several high-
profile individuals Sadat had earlier imprisoned. This 
included journalist and author Mohamad Heikal, feminist 
leader Dr. Nawal al-Sadawi and numerous Muslim Brothers 
including the editor of the Brother’s journal al-Dawa.126 
This move may have been an attempt to placate the Islamists 
and other elements of Egyptian society that were critical 
of the government’s heavy-handed policies. It may have been 
a gesture to empower the more moderate Islamists while the 
government continued to repress the militant ones, 
especially those belonging to al-Jihad and the Gemaa. In 
Mubarak’s favor was a perception that the president was a 
fair man, punishing the corruption of high-ranking 
individuals. For example, President Sadat’s brother Ismat 
had been accused of corruption, and Mubarak permitted the 
criminal trial take place without government 
intervention.127 This was seen by some as a sign that 
President Mubarak was at least attempting to make the 
government more transparent and less corrupt. 
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 Although Mubarak has at times taken steps to minimize 
at least the perceptions of corruption in the Egyptian 
government, the government has taken strong steps in order 
to limit government access for opposition groups. There is 
no question that in modern Egyptian history, the most 
powerful movement has been the Islamist movement. Far and 
away the forerunner in sheer numbers of people as well as 
in political influence has been and is the Brotherhood. At 
certain times during Mubarak’s tenure, the Brotherhood put 
forward a formidable legitimate challenge to the 
government, such as the parliamentary elections of 1987 
where Islamists won twenty-two percent of the seats in the 
parliament. More often than not however, the government 
used many various means to limit the power of opposition 
groups. In order for the government to retain a measure of 
legitimacy (at least with foreign governments or agencies). 
much of the means of limiting Islamist power has been 
legal, such as election law “reform” or the passing of new 
laws. As will become evident, each of these laws limits the 
power of groups that would oppose the government’s power 
hold.  
 
B. BARRIERS TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
 The first law of importance that still has an effect 
on the Islamist movement was passed during the Nasser 
regime: Law 32. This law regulates non-governmental (NGO) 
activity in Egypt. According to this law, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs (MOSA) has the ultimate power to regulate 
anything having to do with NGOs in Egypt. It has the powers 
of   “registration,   control,   supervision,   regulation,  
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oversight, management, direction, appointment etc.”128 
Specific examples of the powers of MOSA regarding NGOs are 
as follows: 
MOSA may refuse an association permission to be 
formed, prevent money from coming to an 
association from abroad, appoint a temporary 
board of directors, dissolve an association and 
transfer its money to another, merge two or more 
associations doing similar activities, deny 
permission to raise fund through donations and 
other methods of collecting money for social 
purposes. The authorization granting such control 
and oversight goes on and on throughout the text 
of the law.129 
 
These examples demonstrate the far-reaching powers the 
government has given its own ministry to rein in any NGOs 
that would pretend to leach power from the government. MOSA 
is but one layer of oversight and bureaucracy that NGOs 
must endure in order to carry out their desired functions.  
 A related piece of legislation, Law 43, was passed in 
1979. This is the law of local administration and gives 
each of Egypt’s 26 governorates administrative powers over 
NGOs.130 This law demonstrates the Egyptian government’s 
dedication to the oversight of NGO activities and 
bureaucratic layering of challenges potential opposition 
groups and/or NGOs must go through. 
 While the Egyptian government has not given many 
concessions to Islamists, it did offer one that moves 
toward all Islamist’s goal of the implementation of sharia. 
In an attempt to court the favor of the Islamists, in 1980, 
the Egyptian government amended Article 2 of its 
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constitution, “making Islamic sharia the only source of 
legislation.”131 This was applauded by the Brotherhood as a 
move toward the eventual implementation of a true sharia 
legal system. While this amendment does seem to give 
credence to the moderate Islamists, the government has been 
quick to curtail the influence and power of groups such as 
the Brotherhood when the government felt challenged. 
 The main contemporary barrier to political 
participation in Egypt is arguably the Emergency Law, which 
has been in effect since Sadat’s death in 1981. This law 
“gives the government sweeping authority and control over 
societal activities and authorizes censorship of printed 
materials, restrictions on meetings and gathering, and 
arrests on the basis of suspicion.”132 As will be 
illustrated throughout this study this law has been and is 
used extensively to suit the needs of the government to 
rein in militants and to serve its ultimate goal of 
retaining power. Thousands of Egyptians have been detained 
without trial over of the last two decades or have been 
tried by an emergency court, which does not use the same 
rules as a normal civil court in Egypt. According to the 
Egyptian Organization for Human Rights and Human Rights 
Watch/Middle East, hundreds of episodes of torture have 
been carried out by governmental officials under the 
auspices of this Emergency Law. Of course, those that 
challenge the power of the regime are most at risk for such 
punishment, therefore Islamists make up a large portion of 
those treated in this manner by their own government.133 The 
broad and non-specific powers contained in this law allow 
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the government to have true authoritarian power over goings 
on in Egypt.  
 
C. THE BROTHERHOOD CREATES A NICHE IN SOCIETY 
 Despite operating under the constraints of Law 32 and 
the Emergency Law, the Brotherhood was nevertheless able to 
establish itself as a viable political force by providing 
services and goods to the people, often better than the 
government. Further,  the Brotherhood appealed to Muslim 
Egyptian’s sense of community and identity.  
 The penetration of the Brotherhood in professional 
associations in Egypt such as the bar association, engineer 
associations and physicians associations exemplifies how 
well the Islamists are respected across the country. The 
leadership of many of these organizations as well as NGOs 
is largely made up of Brotherhood members who are indeed 
Islamists themselves. The Brotherhood seeks to change 
society and governments from the bottom up, rather than by 
coup or other violent means. Winning elections of unions or 
prestigious professional associations demonstrates that the 
Brotherhood is moving toward the attainment of this goal.  
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 Vital to the resurgence of Islamist popularity is 
their ability to see the problems of ordinary Egyptians and 
meet their various needs. The Brotherhood has an advanced 
system of such support networks across Egypt to help solve 
problems that the government is either unable or unwilling 
to address. These include such issues as health care, 
education, banking/loans, legal services/consultations, and 
job training. While the Islamists are not able to solve all 
of these problems, “...the fact that they are trying tells 
the ordinary Egyptian that these people, from their own 
communities, at least care and that the government, its 
corrupt and lazy bureaucracy, and especially its powerful 
and effective security forces do not care, are not trying 
to help, and are in fact making matters worse.”134  
 According to Munson, the Brotherhood’s ability and 
method of moving into new areas was critical to their 
success in Egyptian society. The organization typically 
moves into new areas by first establishing a mosque. After 
providing religious teaching to members of the community 
and receiving zakat and other income, the new center would 
start some sort of public service in order to attract a 
following. This included building schools, clinics, or 
running youth programs. The rapid expansion of the 
Brotherhood and its spirit of public service quickly made 
it a popular group with ordinary Egyptians.135 
 In addition to providing for basic needs, some 
Islamist groups offer other incentives for joining their 
movements. The Brotherhood for example, is an important 
part of the social fabric of communities where people not 
only can be a positive contribution to a group but can also 
receive benefits for themselves and their families. This 
sometimes includes employment networks, dating/marriage 
opportunities and even day care services amongst members of 
the community of Islamists.136  
 All of the above-mentioned factors are reasons 
Egyptians would want to join or at least support the 
Islamists. The Islamists are often sincere in their efforts 
to help people and remain part of the community, while the 
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government is viewed as corrupt, bureaucratic and 
inefficient. This very popularity of the Islamists is what 
makes them a threat to the Mubarak government, even though 
the Brotherhood has denounced violence and has expressed 
their intentions to work within legal means, accommodating 
the government and taking the opportunities afforded them 
legally. 
 
D. MUBARAK ACCOMMODATES THE MODERATE ISLAMISTS  
 The Mubarak government was initially accommodating to 
the Brotherhood and other peaceful Islamists after Sadat’s 
assassination. One theory is that the government knew its 
position was tenuous and wanted to consolidate power by 
accommodating Islamists who denounced anti-government 
violence. Another theory is that Mubarak sincerely wanted 
to move toward a more democratic society. The former is 
more likely than the latter in light of history and the 
regional political landscape. Meanwhile, Sadat’s assassins 
were tried and executed for their crime.  
 This brief moment in the early 1980s shows an 
interesting snapshot of a mix of selective accommodation of 
peaceful Islamists and discriminate repression of violent 
Islamists. This short period of time reflects the 
recommendations by Hafez on how Islamists should be treated 
by governments as they strive for increased 
democratization. In fact Hafez states, “governments in the 
Muslim world, and the Western states that take them as 
their allies...must exercise a delicate balance between 
institutional inclusion of moderates and targeted 
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repression of radicals.”137 The only other option for 
policymakers and governments is to continue with the status 
quo by excluding Islamists from political participation and 
repressing them as a group which would serve only to 
legitimize and empower the radicals among them.138  
 
E. ISLAMISTS EXCLUDED FROM POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
 This opportunity to move toward democratization and 
inclusion of the Islamists was interrupted in the mid 1980s 
by new laws. These new anti-inclusion laws were spurred by 
numerous circumstances. The first was the explosive growth 
of Islamist organizations and influence across Egypt. 
Starting in the universities and professional associations, 
the Brotherhood won elections in these groups across the 
campuses of Egypt. Students who had been activists during 
the Sadat era were now employed either in government or in 
the private sector but maintained the Islamist views 
attained during their days as students. These maturing 
professionals started to take leadership roles in society 
and thus were seen as a challenge to the government.   
 The second factor increasing Islamist power was the 
rapid expansion of the Islamic banking sector across the 
Muslim world. The Middle East oil business had now been a 
high growth industry for decades, and while Egypt did not 
have a large petroleum reserve, many Egyptians had worked 
in the Arabian peninsula’s oil industry. They sent their 
newfound wealth home to Egypt, and deposited it in Islamic 
banks. These banks did not pay interest, currently 
interpreted in Islamic law as usury, but rather an annual 
                                                 




return. Usury is forbidden in the Quran and thus is not 
permissible. Nevertheless, some Islamic banks or investment 
companies offered annual returns of nearly 25 percent! 
These banks were very successful: they had ties to the 
black market and experience in thwarting government 
scrutiny, and benefited from religious leaders’ blessings. 
They were hailed as following sharia while conventional 
banks were criticized through fatwas (religious rulings).  
 In 1988 the government stepped in and reversed its 
earlier support of Islamic financial institutions. The fear 
was that the Islamists would amass enough financial 
resources to empower the Brothers in bolder steps against 
the government. The government decided to run a campaign 
against these companies. Egyptian newspapers that had 
earlier run advertisements for these financial institutions 
now ran columns against them alleging ties to militant 
extremists. Allegations of fraud were also put forth. The 
result was a rush by some members of the public to withdraw 
their funds, driving a few of the institutions to file for 
bankruptcy.139 Again, the government took action when it 
felt there might have been a threat to its power and 
influence, despite the fact that this threat took the form 
of a peaceful legitimate challenge and not a violent coup 
threat. 
 
F. ISLAMISTS AND ELECTION PARTICIPATION 
 Electoral manifestations of the growing influence of 
the Brotherhood and other Islamists across Egypt were clear 
during the parliamentary elections of 1984, when 58 seats 
out of 448 (13 percent) of the seats were won by opposition 
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groups. Three years later opposition candidates won 100 out 
of 458 (22 percent) seats in parliament. Of these 100 
seats, Brotherhood candidates won thirty-six. This made the 
Brotherhood the leading opposition group in the parliament 
after the elections in 1987. In order to retain this newly 
found freedom, Brotherhood leaders steadfastly maintained 
their commitment to pluralism, nonviolence and gradual 
change in Egypt. An interesting aspect of this acquiescence 
to the government’s legitimacy was that the Brotherhood 
supported Mubarak’s nomination for re-election to the 
Presidency in 1987.140  
 The more radical elements of the Islamist movement 
criticized the Brotherhood for participating in the 
electoral process. They argued that true political access 
was denied since the legislative branch has no real 
decision-making power. However, Mustapha Mashhur, the fifth 
general guide of the Brotherhood, gave five reasons for 




                                                
Through the prominent parliamentary platform 
and immunity granted to (them), the 
Brotherhood could clarify the meaning of its 
slogan “Islam is the Solution,” which is one 
of the means of commanding the good and 
prohibiting the forbidden. 
Through the parliamentary platform the 
Brotherhood could hold the government and 
the ruling party accountable for their 
policies as well as attempt to persuade them 
to adopt an alternative path. If the 
Brotherhood does not succeed it still 
benefits because it let the people know it 
position while exposing its opponent. 
Participating in elections is akin to public 
education, for it allows the people to hear 
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Participating in elections is akin to a 
public referendum on the slogan “Islam is 
the Solution,” thus allowing the Brotherhood 
to gauge its public support. 
Through election campaigns and parliament, 
the Brotherhood could discover its opponents 
and what they hide in their hearts. Is also 
allows the Brotherhood to discover the 
supporters of the movement who are willing 
to defend it with their pens and tongues.141 
 
 The later part of the 1980s saw few acts of political 
violence in Egypt. An Islamist group known as “Survivors 
from Hell Fire” did attempt three assassinations against 
two different former ministers of the interior and the 
editor of a secular magazine. None of these attempts was 
successful.142 Perhaps this brief period of the state’s 
accommodation of moderate Islamists again had a 
marginalizing effect on the jihadi groups. 
 
G. NEW ELECTION REFORM AND POLITICAL EXCLUSION 
 The 1990s ushered in a new era in politics in Egypt. 
The government again saw that the Islamists were gaining in 
public support and took steps to change the outcome of the 
1990 parliamentary elections. In 1990, the Supreme 
Constitutional Court ruled that the current election laws 
unfairly discriminated against independent candidates, and 
declared the previous parliamentary elections nullified. 
President Mubarak subsequently disbanded the parliament and 
appointed a legal team to draft new election laws.143 Soon 
 
141 In al-Liwa al-Islami, (June 1987); Hafez; 50. 
142 Hafez 52. 
 70
143 Pripstein-Posusney, “Behind the Ballot Box: Authoritarian Elections and Oppositional Strategies in the 
Middle East” Middle East Report, no. 209, (Winter, 1998) 15. 
after, the state issued new electoral Laws 201, 202, and 
206 to replace the now-defunct Law 188. While these laws 
did allow for individual candidates, they did not satisfy 
the Islamists. One drastic effect of new Law 206 was that 
it gerrymandered the districts in order to heavily favor 
the ruling NDP. The opposition groups had no input in the 
content of the new laws. The result of these laws was 
upsetting enough to opposition groups that they decided to 
boycott the 1990 parliamentary elections in order to 
delegitimize the outcome. The result of these elections was 
that less than two percent of the seats went to the 
opposition.  
 
H. ANTI-STATE VIOLENCE ESCALATES 
 The period between the 1990 and 1995 elections was 
marked by government exclusion and repression of Islamists 
including members of the Brotherhood. The government 
probably realized that its support base was low due to 
several factors, including the government’s unpopular 
support of coalition forces in the Gulf War as well as the 
1990 election boycott by the Islamists. These factors may 
have helped lead to drastic rises in the numbers of acts of 
political violence carried out by Islamists across Egypt 
from 1992 through 1997. During this five year period, 
according to official figures, 1,442 people died due to 
such incidents of violence.144 Members of Gemaa and al-Jihad 
carried out most of these acts while the Brotherhood 
continued to shun violence.  
 While it is unknown whether there is a direct 
connection between the government’s political exclusion and 
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repression of Islamists and the acts of violence during 
this period, trends indicate that when moderate groups like 
the Brotherhood are repressed and excluded, the radicals 
are empowered to act out violently. When the government 
indiscriminately represses all Islamists, the jihadi groups 
are able to more convincingly argue that the moderates 
attempting political participation are merely prolonging 
the inevitable by legitimizing an oppressive regime that 
never intends to share power with Islamists. Additionally, 
members of the society at large that are not Islamists but 
rather interested Muslims may ascribe legitimacy to certain 
acts of violence in these circumstances. Their support is 
generally turned off by the violence when innocent 
bystanders are killed or injured.  
 Interestingly, as the acts of anti-state violence 
increased, the government tightened its grip on the control 
of Islamist groups by passing more laws. In 1992, the 
Antiterrorism Law was passed giving the government the 
power to execute people for just belonging to a “terrorist” 
group.145 Indeed as the Gemaa increasingly challenged 
government hegemony violently, especially in Upper Egypt, 
the state also became more violent. The number of Islamists 
killed increased each year from 1992 through 1995, as the 
government initiated a shoot-to-kill policy regarding 
Islamists confronting the authorities. Nineteen ninety-five 
was indeed a violent year: over 200 Islamists were killed 
during clashes with authorities. Meanwhile, thousands of 
Islamists and their supporters and family members were 
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arrested and detained in the period through the 1990s until 
violence ceased in 1998.146 
 
I. MUBARAK INCREASES REPRESSION 
 If the early 1980s were a doorway to an opportunity to 
move toward democracy due to accommodation of moderate 
Islamists and repression of the violent ones, then the 
early 1990s were the opposite. The state felt insecure due 
to numerous clashes with Islamists. Other Arab regional 
political concerns such as the Egypt’s support of coalition 
forces during the unpopular Gulf War caused domestic unrest 
and complicated the issues. Thus it carried out a massive 
crackdown on Islamists starting in 1992, the same year the 
attacks on tourists had begun. Much of the unrest was in 
Upper Egypt, a known stronghold of the Gemaa. While part of 
this unrest is likely anti-state Islamism under the 
auspices of the teachings of Sayyid Qutb, another element 
of this unrest was probably due to domestic, regional 
politics. The problem is the domination of southern Egypt 
by northern Egyptians. Fandy writes, “The focus on poverty 
and injustice in the south seems to be a dominant theme in 
al-Gemaa’s pronouncements. Unlike the Brotherhood, al-
Gemaa’s main writings do not dwell on larger Middle Eastern 
questions such as pan-Arabism, the Palestinian question, or 
Israel and the West.”147 Whereas many members of the 
Brotherhood were physicians and engineers, most of the 
Gemaa were from the lower or middle classes. 
 The Gemaa increased its activities and carried out 
many attacks on various public figures including the 
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Egyptian minister of information, Sawat Shair, the former 
minister of the interior General Hasan al-Alfi, Nobel 
laureate Naguib Mahfouz and the popular secular journalist 
Farag Foda.148 
 Partially in response to these acts by the Gemaa, the 
Egyptian government passed the Antiterrorism Law of 1992. 
This new law was similar to other previous laws in that it 
gave the government sweeping powers. This time, the law 
allowed the government to execute people for merely 
belonging to a “terrorist” group.149 
 Another step the government took to reign in the 
influence of the Islamists was to obtain more control over 
private mosques. The Ministry of Religious Endowments had 
the power to incorporate any mosques not currently overseen 
by the government. In 1992 the government announced that it 
intended to nationalize all 140,000 such private mosques 
throughout Egypt.150 This was an ambitious goal, however, 
since the government needed to train and employ new imams 
(prayer leaders) for each mosque. According to Dr. Muhammad 
Ali Mahgub, the minister in charge of the operation, the 
main target of the initial action was an area of Upper 
Egypt around Asyut, Minya and Sohag, where there were 1,750 
mosques that were known to be controlled by “extremists.” 
Further, according to Mahgub, the cost of taking such 
nationalizing action was projected at 300 million Egyptian 
pounds.151 Perhaps the biggest challenge was the shortage of 
imams. Initially the government hired all 5,000 graduated 
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from the al-Azhar school in 1992 and also began a program 
to train an additional 15,000 new imams. In the end 
however, the state’s goals could not be met and they were 
forced to allow some Islamist organizations to operate in 
at least some of the mosques throughout Egypt.152  
 As the high levels of violence continued in Egypt 
through 1992 and into 1993, the government took further 
actions to marginalize Islamists. Until the new “Syndicates 
Law” was passed in 1993, the professional associations 
throughout Egypt were mostly led by Islamists, chiefly 
member of the Brotherhood. This sector of Egypt’s civil 
society had been gradually courted by the Islamists and by 
the late 1980s managed to become the most numerous groups 
of persons elected to the leadership posts of organizations 
such as the Egyptian Medical Association, the Egyptian 
Pharmacists Association and other prestigious white-collar 
organizations. Notably, the elections for board members of 
these associations have typically low voter turnout on the 
order of 23 percent or less.153  
 The state realized these associations had influence 
across Egypt and became alarmed when they realized that the 
Brotherhood had taken over most of the leadership of these 
professional associations. In a manner similar to their 
electoral engineering actions for national elections, the 
1993 Syndicates Law took advantage of the low voter 
turnouts for these associations by ruling that at lease 50 
percent of organization members must vote in order for the 
elections to be considered valid.154  
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 Almost as interesting as the legislation itself was 
the manner in which it was passed into law. When opposition 
(Islamist) members of parliament heard that such a law 
might be in the works, they insisted upon being involved in 
the writing of the legislation. The government denied such 
a law was being considered until 15 February 1993 when it 
was proposed in the parliament. Two days later, the law was 
enacted. The true hegemony of the government and ability of 
the executive (President Mubarak) to pass laws was revealed 
in this legislative show of force.155 
 The Mubarak government continued the spiral of 
repression and violence by passing the Egyptian 
Universities Act amendment in 1994. In the spirit of the 
Syndicates Law passed the previous year, this amendment 
sought to limit the influence of Islamists, this time in 
academic circles. The academic departments of many 
universities across Egypt had elected Islamists as their 
academic deans, giving Islamists more power in Egyptian 
society. The government dissolved this practice with new 
rules, giving government authorities powers to appoint 
academic deans across Egypt.156 
 While this type of repression was less blatant, the 
government took direct actions against Islamists in 1994. 
First, an Islamist lawyer died in state custody one day 
after his arrest and the government was not open about the 
cause of death. Following the announcement of his death, 
hundreds of lawyers marched in protest of the state’s 
brutality. Thirty three of them were arrested, many of whom 
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were members of the Brotherhood.157 Finally, in 1994, the 
state again outlawed the Brotherhood. Mubarak stated that 
the “Muslim Brotherhood is an illegal organization...behind 
most activities of the troublemakers camp.”158 The 
Brotherhood publicly denounced violence and attempted to 
distance themselves from groups like Gemaa and al-Jihad. 
This brought the Brotherhood more public support from 
ordinary Egyptians, support which was probably more 
threatening to the regime than the militant attacks by the 
jihadis. Nonetheless, the government targeted the 
Brotherhood with repression in the mid-90s by attempting to 
tie them to the activities of violent Islamists. During 
this period the state argued that the “Muslim Brotherhood 
and the jihadists are two sides of the same coin...The 
(Brotherhood) and the Gemaa, the regime argued, engaged in 
role distribution to achieve their goal of destabilizing 
and toppling the regime.”159  
 The counter argument to this view is that the 
Islamists were anything but unified in their goals and 
denounced each others’ activities publicly. Even the 
regime’s activities betrayed its public denouncement of the 
Brotherhood and Gemaa as co-conspiratorial groups, 
evidenced by the lenient sentencing received by Brotherhood 
members compared to the more radical Islamists arrested by 
the state.160 While the Brotherhood members were repressed 
by the state, members of the Gemaa received even harsher 
treatment at the hands of the state. While the Brotherhood 
members received lighter sentences and shorter detention 
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periods, the Gemaa faced mass arrests and extrajudicial 
killings by the state.161 This does demonstrate that the 
state engaged in selective repression.  
 Nineteen ninety five saw the further intensification 
of violence as the Gemaa attempted to assassinate President 
Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The government’s reaction 
was “ruthless repression, and in the end, the tide swung 
decisively in its favor. The Gemaa had failed to mobilize 
the urban masses...and was now obliged to fall back on 
sporadic sorties against tourists, Copts, and policemen 
from its bases in the Nile Valley.”162  
 
J. ELECTION TAMPERING AND INTERFERENCE 
 That same year, 1995 was another parliamentary 
election year. Due to the assassination attempt on the 
president, the government was in no mood to accommodate the 
Islamists in their election bids. The government openly 
stated that the elections would be free and fair and that 
opposition parties would be allowed. Contrary to government 
claims however, opposition leaders and human rights groups 
stated that the 1995 parliamentary elections were 
characterized by a high level of repression and 
interference.163 All told, the 1995 elections were probably 
the most repressive elections to date. Shortly before the 
elections, the government made strong moves against the 
opposition, mainly the Brotherhood. Shortly before the 
election, the government closed the Cairo offices of the 
Brotherhood and arrested fifty-four Brotherhood members 
(many were political candidates), on charges that they had 
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engaged in “unconstitutional activities.” These men were 
sentenced by military courts to jail sentences ranging from 
three to five years. Then the government’s Interior 
Minister Hasa al-Alfi announced that the Brothers, al-
Jihad, and Gemaa were all part of the same group, and the 
night before the election over one thousand brothers were 
arrested.164 Finally, when the elections were held the 
government resorted to intimidation, ballot stuffing, and 
outright violence on election day. When the elections were 
completed 50 people had been killed and nearly 900 were 
wounded. Needless to say the Islamists did not fare well in 
the 1995 elections with the ruling NDP party “winning” 94 
percent of the seats.165  
 Fortunately, the 2000 elections were a departure from 
the repressive policies of the past. Prior to the 
elections, Egypt’s constitutional court had ruled that the 
previous two parliamentary elections were invalid since 
they were not judicially supervised. Thus, the court 
declared the results from the previous two elections 
invalid. Shortly thereafter, the government passed election 
reform laws that made them subject to the oversight and 
scrutiny of Egypt’s judiciary. While government 
representatives praised the Mubarak regime for conducting 
“free and fair” elections, Islamists were again blocked 
from full participation. Brotherhood members were arrested 
prior to the elections and interference was noted at 
certain polling stations. Nonetheless, opposition seats 
more than doubled from the 1995 elections and Brotherhood 
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members managed to garner seventeen seats in the 
parliament166 by running as independents.167  
 Since gaining independence from Britain, Egypt has 
never had “free and fair” elections in a Western sense. 
Egypt’s elections have historically been marred by out and 
out vote rigging, gerrymandering, arresting and jailing 
opposition party members, banning certain opposition 
(usually Islamist) parties and finally changing election 
laws to suit the needs of the government in a given 
election. As Egypt moves toward the next elections in 2005 
when Mubarak is up for re-election, it will be interesting 
to see just how “free and fair” the elections will be.  
 There is room for hope as Egypt’s election laws have 
recently empowered the judiciary with some oversight in an 
attempt to legitimize the elections. There have been some 
important judicial decisions in recent years that actually 
demonstrate this power. An example from June of 2000 shows 
that the Constitutional Court actually struck down the 
government’s new law restricting civil associations and 
institutions. According to Wickham, this judicial power 
should not be overstated since “if Egypt’s judges have 
limited the regime’s freedom of maneuver, it is only 
because the regime has chosen to honor their decisions.”168 
 
K. GEMAA VIOLENCE BACKFIRES 
 Toward the late 1990s the government’s brutal 
repression of Islamists, especially members of the Gemaa 
began to become successful. Actual acts of violent 
incidents seemed to be on the wane until the Gemaa attacked 
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and killed 58 tourists in Luxor on 17 November 1997.169 This 
attack devastated Egypt’s tourism industry and economy. The 
Islamists in turn lost any hope of getting the sympathies 
of the Egyptian public. Interestingly, different factional 
leaders of the Gemaa released conflicting statements after 
the Luxor massacre, some praising the attack while others 
denounced it. Eventually, Gemaa leaders including the 
imprisoned (in the United States for the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing) Shaikh Abdul Rahman called for a unilateral 
cease-fire with the government that actually took place in 
November of 1998. Once the Egyptian government realized 
that the Gemaa were sincere in their cease-fire 
declaration, some concessions were made including the 
release of some imprisoned members.170  
 Although the government seemed to come to a sort of 
“agreement” with the Gemaa after periods of severe 
repression, the violence-denouncing Brotherhood continued 
to be the real challenge to the government due to their 
immersion in society. In 1999, the government demonstrated 
their concern over the power of the Brotherhood by 
arresting twenty Brotherhood leaders “including prominent 
members of the Lawyers’, Engineers’, Doctors’, 
Pharmacists’, and Veterinarians’ Associations.”171 After a 
long and much publicized trial, fifteen of the twenty 
received prison terms for belonging to an illegal group and 
planning to overthrow the government.172  
 Wickham states that the government had three goals in 
this arrest and trial. The first was to increase the risks 
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of membership in an Islamist political group (the 
Brotherhood). The second goal was to transform the public 
image of the Brotherhood from a moderate, peaceful group to 
that of a radical group that endangered the government and 
thus the stability of Egypt. This was accomplished through 
the tactical use of the media. The final goal of the 
government was to prevent these influential and popular 
members of the Brotherhood from running for office in both 
the parliament and in the professional associations.173 
 
L. MUBARAK MAINTAINS THE STATUS QUO 
 Examining the violence, arrests, and deaths of 
Islamists since Sadat’s death in 1981174 demonstrates that 
the Mubarak regime has not allowed much political 
opportunity for opposition groups, especially the Islamist 
ones. The government appears to have taken reactionary and 
mostly indiscriminate measures after Islamists have been 
able to mobilize, which according to Mohammad Hafez is not 
very effective. Hafez argues that more effective tactics 
would include institutional inclusion of moderates while 
targeting known radicals with repressive activities.175 This 
behavior in theory would empower the moderates, marginalize 
the radicals and give the government a legitimacy they 
cannot gain by repressing broad groups of people. 
 My analysis shows that the government’s denial of 
political opportunities is cyclical, corresponding to 
election periods. While periods between elections have been 
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relatively peaceful in Egypt in recent years, it is 
difficult to judge whether the government is being either 
inclusive or repressive as both parties have much more at 
stake during the election periods than during the “in-
between” years. The upcoming 2005 elections should be 
scrutinized to determine if indeed any real electoral 
reforms have taken place in Egypt, or if the status quo 
remains. Conventional wisdom and cynicism point toward the 
latter, as authoritarian regimes are loath to share any 
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V. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OR EXCLUSION OF THE 
ISLAMISTS? 
 
A. MODERN ISLAMISM IN EGYPT: CYCLES OF VIOLENCE, 
REPRESSION AND CO-OPTATION 
 When modern Islamism began in 1928 with the 
Brotherhood, it was mostly an anti-colonial and pro-
caliphate group of people. It was also a reaction to the 
corruption of government and the westernization of Egypt 
which Hasan al-Banna viewed as a seed for the decline in 
moral values across Egypt. In al-Banna’s views, Islam was 
(and is) the “solution” to all problems. As the Brotherhood 
rapidly grew in the first 25 years of its existence it 
became bolder and took an active role in the 1948 war on 
the side of the Palestinians, alongside Egyptian government 
troops. While critical of King Farouk’s complicity with the 
British, the Brotherhood did attempt to persuade the King 
to adopt sharia.  
 When King Farouk felt his regime was threatened by the 
Brotherhood and banned them, violence between the two 
spiraled, resulting in the deaths of the Egyptian prime 
minister and al-Banna. 
 While there was not much political inclusion of any 
citizens during the days of King Farouk, the banning of the 
Brotherhood galvanized the organization. Since they already 
had decades to build and take root across Egypt, banning 
such an established organization had negative consequences 
for the government. Certainly, repressing the Brotherhood 
rather than co-opting them did not help the Farouk 
government, which was already limited by its lack of 
independent status. Certainly, the British would not have 
tolerated the imposition of sharia across Egypt any more 
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than Farouk would have. In the context of the times, 
therefore, it is questionable how much say Farouk really 
had in how the Brotherhood was treated. Nonetheless, 
attempts by al-Banna to meet with the King fell on deaf 
ears, and both the government and the Brotherhood continued 
their escalating levels of violence.  
 No other group actively challenged the Farouk 
government’s power the way the Brotherhood did until the 
Free Officers’ coup established a new government in 1952. 
Had the Farouk government not banned the Brotherhood but 
rather at least given them an audience for their 
grievances, it is likely that the assassination of the 
prime minister would not have occurred. Other than this one 
prominent act of violence carried out by Brotherhood 
members, there were no other major acts of anti-government 
violence carried out during Farouk’s rein. In the context 
of the nature of the Farouk regime it is difficult to 
theorize what the Brotherhood’s course of action would have 
been had they not been banned. However, King Farouk’s reign 
and its violence can be interpreted in light of this 
study’s thesis, that groups included in the government in 
some way, even through co-optation, are forced to moderate 
as they try to balance their member’s goals with the room 
they have been given by the government. 
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 The Nasser government faced a different situation. The 
Free Officers came to power under the premise of pushing 
the British out of Egypt and establishing a new system of 
government. When Nasser assumed the leadership of Egypt, he 
banned the Brotherhood almost immediately as he saw them as 
a challenge to his consolidation of power, particularly due 
to their assassination attempt on him in 1954. 
Furthermore, Nasser did not feel he needed a coalition with 
the Islamists, therefore in his view, marginalizing them 
was of low risk. Nasser had his own ideas for that quickly 
became popular in Egypt. His ability to play the Russians 
and West against each other, his socialist Arab nationalism 
and his personal charisma made him popular, at least until 
the defeat of the 1967 war with Israel.  
 This defeat at the hands of the Israelis gave the 
Islamists an avenue for verbal attacks against the 
credibility of the secular Nasser government. They argued 
that the Israelis had been true to their faith and thus 
succeeded in battle against Arab armies guided by 
governments not following Islam.  
 The group of Islamists that attempted to assassinate 
Nasser a second time in 1965 gave Nasser reason to again 
brutally repress anyone that got in his way. Their leader, 
Qutb, was executed and became a martyr for militant 
Islamists in Egypt for years to come. 
 In the end, Nasser retained power, successfully 
repressing anyone that attempted to challenge his vision 
for Egypt up until his death in 1970. His repression was 
brutal and indiscriminate. Qutb wrote of an occasion where 
twenty-one of his Islamist prison-mates were attacked by 
prison guards and allowed to die in an inhumane fashion.176 
This example demonstrates the brutality of Nasser’s regime. 
Unlike the following two governments, the Nasser government 
never sought to co-opt the Islamists but rather 
indiscriminately repressed them, similar to his 
predecessor, King Farouk. 
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 Due to the lack in variation in Nasser’s policies, it 
is again difficult to study or imagine a case where 
moderate Islamists were given a voice in governmental 
policies. The last two governments of Egypt make for more 
interesting study as they both have allowed some levels of 
political participation by Islamists. 
 The Sadat government enlisted the support of Islamists 
shortly after coming to power in 1970. President Sadat was 
not a socialist, unlike his predecessor, and may have 
actually had a lingering soft spot for the Brotherhood 
since his meetings with Hasan al-Banna in the 1940s.  
 Moreover, Sadat was a more devout Muslim than his 
predecessor and as such, he released certain Islamists from 
prison. He then co-opted a segment of Islamists to balance 
against the still-powerful Nasserists inside and outside 
the government in Egypt. This was the main reason Sadat 
tried to appease the Islamists  
 Once more given free reign, the Islamist movement 
again grew. The now-peaceful Brotherhood had denounced 
violence, but offshoots of the group were more militant. 
Implementation of sharia was not negotiable for them.  
 The single largest topic of disagreement with the 
Sadat regime for the Islamists was peace with Israel. After 
Sadat made his trip to Israel, the Islamists were mobilized 
and began to take anti-government action. In response, 
Sadat tightened his grip on the Islamists’ by passing new, 
restrictive laws, limiting their governmental power and 
influence.  
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 This exclusion of the Islamists from the positions of 
power they held and expected to continue holding marked the 
start of a spiral of violence leading up to Sadat’s 
assassination. Repression became widespread and reactive, 
which only served to legitimize the behavior of the jihadis 
among some sectors of Egyptian society. In the months 
before Sadat’s death, his policies would become more 
repressive than ever during his regime.  
 The actions of the Sadat regime and reactions of the 
Islamists, especially toward the end of the regime, support 
the thesis that when Islamists are politically excluded (as 
they were here) they turn to their only remaining avenue to 
force their point: violence. 
 The subsequent government in Egypt, under Mubarak, is 
similar to Sadat’s in that he at times allowed Islamists to 
participate in government and other public realms, but at 
other times erected large barriers to participation. The 
last twenty four years in Egypt have been the most 
interesting for the subject of this study, since there have 
been cycles of repression and political inclusion of 
Islamists. Recently, the Islamists have been frequently 
included when the government feels secure in its 
consolidation of power, and Mubarak’s government pays 
public lip-service to the concept of democracy. As we have 
seen, however, the Mubarak government has become more 
authoritarian of late and has used the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks to consolidate his power using the goal 
of fighting terrorism.  
 Egypt has taken some small steps to appear more reform 
minded. This includes the establishment of the new National 
Council for Human Rights in January of 2004. Mubarak even 
appointed former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
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Ghali as head of the council.177 The bottom line is while 
Mubarak has often taken such symbolic steps toward 
political reform, political access is no more a reality now 
than is was when Mubarak came to power in 1981. The 
Emergency Law is still in effect even though Sadat’s death 
occurred over twenty years ago. This never-ending emergency 
defies logic and dilutes the real meaning of an emergency, 
defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “a serious, 
unexpected, and potentially dangerous situation requiring 
immediate action.”178 Of course the assassination of Sadat 
was an emergency, however, this study argues that the 
continuation of this particular law is an exercise in 
duplicity.  
 Even Boutros-Ghali expressed a desire to do away with 
the Emergency Law eventually. For the most part, though, he 
sides with the government that appointed him to his 
position. He stated, “In light of the fundamentalist 
terrorism that we are all now familiar with, security 
problems at times take precedence over the protection of 
civil liberties.”179 The bottom line is that the Egyptian 
government will continue its policies, typical for an 
authoritarian regime, until either internal or external 
pressures force a change. 
 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STATUS QUO IN EGYPT 
 If the Egyptian government does not substantively 
change its election law, or if it continues its policy of 
electoral interference, there will be repercussions. The 
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electorate showed its apathy toward recent Shura Council 
(the upper house of parliament) elections when only ten to 
twenty percent of rural voters and less than ten percent of 
urban voters participated.180 The Shura Council is only 
consultative in nature and one third of its members are 
appointed by the executive. This election result may 
indicate that Egyptians have therefore become indifferent 
to such elections knowing that they have little real power 
to change anything with their vote. 
 The public does seem to demonstrate more activism 
regarding elections for the People’s Assembly (the lower 
house of parliament). Yet constant electoral interference 
in elections, including jailing of opposition candidates 
and intimidation of voters at polling places, continue to 
overshadow the fairness of these elections. 
 All of the indiscriminate repression by the Egyptian 
government will almost surely result in an eventual 
backlash as citizens lose hope for their likelihood of a 
truly representative government. As ordinary Egyptian 
Muslims begin to rely less upon their government and 
increasingly receive services and support from Islamists 
groups such as the Brotherhood, the government’s legitimacy 
and even necessity in the populace’s daily lives may be 
lost. Government actions have created a scenario favorable 
to the ongoing legitimation of the Islamists, particularly 
the Brotherhood which is entrenched in Egyptian society.  
 As long as Islamists like the Brotherhood continue to 
meet social needs that the government cannot or will not 
meet, and the government continues to repress “peaceful” 
Islamists, the public will continue to gravitate toward the 
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Islamists. Maintenance of the status quo will not be 
acceptable, since certain Islamists are bound to tire of 
patiently working within the system to no avail. Episodes 
of anti-state violence will likely follow, as the 
government’s tight-fisted control is unable to stop an 
organized and popular social trend. Unless the Egyptian 
government is willing to tolerate anti-state violence, bona 
fide changes toward democracy must be made.  
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EGYPT’S ISLAMISTS 
 Egypt has the most developed and diverse group of 
Islamists in the world. The history of the modern Islamist 
movement has deep roots in the Brotherhood dating back to 
1928, when their main goals were anti-colonialism and the 
spreading of the message of Islam. 
 These Islamists have at times been violent, attacking 
not only Egyptian government targets but also foreign 
tourists. An example of the latter was the attack at Luxor 
in 1997. Islamists have carried out assassination attempts 
against every President in Egypt’s history and were 
successful in killing Sadat as well as King Farouk’s prime 
minister. Even though Hasan al-Banna denounced the attack, 
it is widely believed that he approved of it prior to being 
carried out.  
 Many prominent Islamists in Egypt such as the late 
Muhammad al-Ghazzaly are quick to denounce violence. Yet 
they are equally motivated to call upon the Egyptian 
government to initiate reform and stop acts of 
indiscriminate repression.181 Ghazzaly was a member of an 
informal group of intellectuals calling themselves the “New 
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Islamists.” This group unequivocally denounces Islamist 
violence. They maintain that radical leaders of certain 
Islamist groups are misleading their followers by teaching 
an extreme version of Islam and undermining the prospects 
for peaceful reform. These New Islamists and others, such 
as the Brotherhood who are quick to denounce Islamist 
violence, are the Islamist’s best opportunity to reform the 
government in Egypt, I argue. The Mubarak regime has shown 
its apprehension of the power of the Brotherhood by 
indiscriminately repressing them, often before and during 
elections when the government risks losing parliamentary 
seats to the Islamists. 
 This study maintains that moderate Islamists who are 
willing to work within the bounds of peaceful democratic 
change could learn from the African National Congress (ANC) 
during the Apartheid era in South Africa. The scenario was 
quite different in South Africa, since race was the 
dividing line between the white elites in power and the 
black majority excluded from it. The important similarity 
is that an elite group of people held exclusive power for 
decades without allowing the majority of the population 
true political inclusion. In the meantime, the government 
became notorious for its policies of non-judicial 
imprisonment and torture of those perceived as a regime 
threat. 
 In this case, during the 1980s the ANC and its black 
members had been classified as a terrorist group by the 
U.S. government.182 This was due to their violent acts 
against government targets. The South African government 
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enjoyed the support of the U.S. until the ANC became an 
imminent threat to the government. At the same time, the 
ANC became successful in publicizing its plight to the 
world community.183 
 This is the important lesson for the Islamists. While 
they seem to have been successful in penetrating Egyptian 
society, unlike the ANC they are not able to challenge the 
regime politically, physically or by mobilizing all of the 
workers across Egypt in an effort to withhold their labor 
power. Additionally, they have not done well in publicizing 
their plight to the West. The United States and Europe 
continue to support the government, or at least remain 
neutral and uninvolved. The Islamists should press the 
world community for greater scrutiny of the actions of the 
government against its own citizens. Groups like Amnesty 
International and Freedom House publish reports critical of 
the government, but this is insufficient. Western 
governments must be directly engaged in some way by 
moderate Islamists. These Islamists must continually 
trumpet their support of the democratic process. 
 
D. DOMESTIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EGYPT 
 It is human nature for people to covet power, 
especially once they have it and are able to experience its 
abilities. This is particularly the case for authoritarian 
governments. Even during changes in leadership, this style 
of government seems to maintain its momentum due to 
cronyism and a viable lack of alternatives acceptable to 
those in power. One only needs to look at recent examples 
of leadership change in North Korea, Syria, Jordan: Kim 
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Jong Il, Bashar Assad and King Abdullah have all basically 
followed in their father’s footsteps, making no significant 
changes to their nations’ policies. The international 
community was particularly interested in the first two of 
these changes, expectant the new policies would be 
implemented with the new government. Yet the status quo has 
been the norm. 
 President Mubarak and his government have changed 
numerous government laws during his tenure. Some of these 
have been applauded, particularly judicial oversight of 
elections. Still, election interference has been the norm. 
Even if parliamentary elections were free and fair, 
ultimate power continues to rest with the President. 
Obviously the Mubarak government has been afraid to let the 
Islamists win a majority of seats, fearing the legitimation 
of popular criticisms against the executive branch as it 
continues to overrule Islamist-generated legislation. 
 Egypt heavily restricts the press and freedoms of 
assembly and association. Interestingly however is the fact 
that Egypt does not restrict use of the internet or 
satellite television.184 Knowledge is power, and this 
freedom of information in Egypt could eventually motivate 
people against the corruption, repression and non-inclusive 
aspects of their government. As the government continues to 
publicize itself as a promoter of democracy, all the while 
inhibiting true power-sharing, an increase in frustration 
among Islamists is bound to occur. History shows that this 
will probably result in the formation of new militant 
groups willing to take violent action, even as the 
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Brotherhood and Gemaa denounce bloodshed. This outcome 
plays into the government’s hands, since they will then be 
able to promote their anti-Islamist agenda by grouping all 
Islamists together. 
 Hopefully, however, Mubarak will follow Sadat’s 
boldness in taking Egypt in a new direction. True moves 
toward democracy will only further legitimate the 
government and isolate violent Islamists, as the moderates 
share power with the government. The Arab world shares the 
dubious distinction of having no true democracies. Mubarak 
would do well to again demonstrate that Egypt can take bold 
new steps, this time toward political inclusion to the 
benefit of all Egyptians. 
 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 
 Since the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 
1979, the U.S. has given large amounts of aid to both 
countries. In the context of the Cold War, it was helpful 
for the United States to have friends in the Middle East, 
and providing a lucrative aid package was one way to 
preserve such friendships. Egypt’s Suez canal gives it a 
strategic importance in the region, due to the need to 
ensure safe passage of ships. This is especially important 
for those carrying oil and liquid natural gas to the world 
market. 
 The United States continues to provide financial aid 
to  Egypt on the order of $1.3 billion annually in military  
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aid. Additionally, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development gave Egypt over $25 billion in aid between 1975 
and 2002.185 
 These policies suited the United States’ need for 
allies and regional stability during the Cold War, but 
today they are of dubious value. From a military power 
perspective, both Israel and Egypt are far more powerful 
than their neighbors and are not a threat to each other due 
to their peace treaty. Israel’s military is more than able 
to deter any state from any direct military confrontation, 
due to its modern forces and the widespread belief it has 
nuclear weapons. Egypt is also militarily powerful, and not 
at risk from its neighbors either. 
 An important side effect of this continued support to 
Egypt, meant to maintain and modernize its military, is the 
creation of a powerful coercive apparatus zealously 
protecting the sitting government. Eva Bellin argues that 
the removal of a robust coercive apparatus is necessary for 
a nation to move toward a democratic transition and 
consolidation.186 As long as the U.S. supports a strong 
military in Egypt, Mubarak is not under any real domestic 
threat to reform.  
 Thus, the U.S. needs to re-examine its foreign policy 
objectives not only in Egypt but across the Arab world in 
general, where many authoritarian regimes are American 
allies. During the Cold War, the unofficial U.S. government 
policy was to support “friendly” authoritarian governments 
as long as they were allies and not sympathetic to the 
Soviets.  
                                                 
185 U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Egypt [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5309.htm] 
Accessed 16 September 2004 
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186 Bellin, 152. 
 Sadly, in the context of the fear of global 
thermonuclear war, such a foreign policy may have been 
justified. Contemporary U.S. foreign policy can no longer 
support such governments, since the concepts of liberty and 
freedom have become ingrained values. Supporting these 
regimes has a price. This study theorizes that this price 
may be that the U.S. and its interests become targets for 
Islamists, whose repressive governments have long been 
allies of the U.S.  
 Regardless of the outcome in Iraq in the next few 
years, U.S. foreign policies need to shift toward placing a 
higher importance on democratic reform. As contemporary 
international relations theory posits, democracies do not 
wage war against other democracies. If stability is indeed 
the goal in the Middle East, democratic reform needs to be 
assertively pushed, and Egypt is a good place to start. 
Truthfully, neither Egypt nor Israel needs the massive 
military aid the U.S. provides annually. If this aid 
continues, laws should be passed to make it contingent upon 
democratic reform and subject to external scrutiny. The 
United States’ recognition of the popularity of moderate 
Islamists may also go a long way toward decreasing some of 
the negative perceptions of the U.S. by Arab public 
opinion. 
 
F. DEMOCRATIC REFORM RECOMMENDED FOR EGYPT  
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 Democratic reform is not uncomplicated. However, both 
practical considerations and moral ones demand changes in 
the policies of both the United States and Egypt. The 
government’s electoral engineering and interference does 
not go unnoticed by the rest of the world and undermines 
the legitimacy of the government both to Egyptian citizens 
and the world community. 
 Co-opting moderate Islamists may seem threatening to 
Mubarak as well as to Western countries, whose public 
continues to embrace Orientalist ideas however, this study 
maintains that when moderate Islamists are allowed to 
participate in politics, they will restrain their stances 
regarding strict interpretations of Islam, as have the New 
Islamists in Egypt. The alternative is the status quo, 
which aside from being immoral in terms of personal liberty 
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